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The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
After Two Decades: Relevant Problems and Ideas
for Necessary Reform
The nation behaves well if it treats the natural resources as assets which it
must turn over to the next generation increased, and not impaired, in value. 1
-Theodore Roosevelt
I. INTRODUCTION
Have states' legislatively enacted environmental policies ade-
quately solved the environmental concerns of haphazard develop-
ment? Consider the following case that recently passed through
California's environmental policing system: The Environmental Coa-
lition of Ventura County recently fought a proposed landfill at Wel-
don Canyon in Ventura County, California.2 The group, intent on
substantially delaying the project and, ultimately, eliminating it, uti-
lized the complicated procedures of the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) to drown the landfill proposal in a sea of bu-
reaucracy.3 The Environmental Coalition demanded that an environ-
mental impact report discuss the risk that the dump might spread
the AIDS virus to landfill workers and visitors through the dumping
of used condoms. 4 After the appropriate agency investigated the
claim, the Coalition demanded a further report on the possibility that
seagulls might pick up the condoms and carry them to urban areas
nearby, creating a widespread AIDS epidemic.5 These far-reaching
environmental concerns, among others, generated a 1475-page report
costing more than $1.2 million for the building of a relatively low-
cost landfill.6
The above example illustrates how an adversarial group can use
the procedural aspects of an environmental policy to delay and dis-
1. Address before the Colorado Live Stock Association (Aug. 29, 1910).
2. Kenneth R. Weiss, Reports Have an Impact on Environment, L.A. TIMEs, Sept.
15, 1991, at BI.
3. IM
4. Id
5. Id,
6. d.
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courage any project that they oppose.7 Although the adoption of
state environmental policies reveals noble legislative goals, problems
surface because of the complexity and confusion engendered through
the statutes' implementation. This Comment will address the
problems with CEQA stemming from nebulous definitions within the
statute by reviewing the past twenty years of CEQA cases in the Cali-
fornia courts. This Comment will also highlight specific instances of
abuse that adversarial groups effect through the environmental im-
pact report procedural process. It will peruse the policies of New
York and Washington, two progressive environmental states, and dis-
cuss the successful features of these states' statutes. Finally, this
Comment will recommend avenues for improving CEQA, including
the possibility of incorporating lessons learned from other states'
statutes into the California statute. The suggested incorporation
would conform to the specific needs of California.
II. THE BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Increases in population limit resources and cause governments to
assess the availability and protection of endangered resources.8 On
January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)9 in response to growing concerns for protecting
the environment.' 0 The statute, along with the subsequently formed
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),"1 comprehensively out-
lined the procedural methods and substantive policies for conserving
the environment. 12 Courts have generally accepted the procedural
7. Id. (citing William Fulton, urban planner and author of Guide to California
Planning).
8. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.921C.020 (West 1983); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103 (McKinney 1984).
Although other states adopting an environmental policy have similar language in their
policy sections, this article will address these three statutes in depth.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (1988). For cases supporting NEPA as a statutory man-
date on federal agencies, see Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Calvert Cl~iffs', an often noted case,
defined the scope of NEPA: "NEPA, first of all, makes environmental protection a
part of the mandate of every federal agency and department." Id. at 1112 (emphasis
added).
10. Many factors encouraged President Nixon to sign the bill. The public grew in-
creasingly wary of the Vietnam War and a careless oil spill in Santa Barbara destroyed
populations of seabirds. See Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy
Act at Twenty: Preface, 20 ENv'rL. L. 447, 448 (1990). Political concerns also affected
the President's decision to respond to public and congressional outcry for a uniform
environmental policy.
11. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1517.7 (1991). The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) consists of three members who report to the President on the quality of the
environment and offer suggestions as to favorable policies to follow. 42 U.S.C. § 4342
(1988).
12. Section 4332(1) of NEPA set forth the policies Congress intended to achieve
while Section 4332(2) established the procedural methods for accomplishing these poli-
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aspects of NEPA,I s but have de-emphasized the significance of poli-
cies envisioned by Congress to cure the world's environmental ills.1 4
The major issues facing state environmental policies pertain to proce-
dural implementation. More specifically, legislatures and courts at-
tempt to provide adequate definitions of a "project" and the
"significant effect" a project may have on the environment.15 Ini-
tially, states based their definitions on those coined in NEPA.16
NEPA procedurally requires all federal agencies to review legislative
proposals and major federal actions.17 The agency responsible for the
action first completes an environmental assessment of the proposed
action.' 8 If the action rises to the level of significance, the agency
cies. The policies include a broad range of goals encompassing both national and
worldwide concerns. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). Notwithstanding these policies, the
United States Supreme Court determined that NEPA manifests a purely procedural
guideline for agency actions rather than a universal doctrine acting as a catalyst to har-
monize man and nature. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). In fact, the United States Supreme
Court has held in favor of governmental agencies in all NEPA cases where the plain-
tiff sought a substantive agency decision declaring a project adverse to the environ-
ment. See David C. Shilton, Is The Supreme Court Hostile To NEPA? Some Possible
Explanations For A 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551 (1990). Notably, the Court discour-
ages judicial action in NEPA cases by allowing great deference to the appropriate
agency and its decision or by looking to CEQ for guidelines. Id. at 566-67. See, e.g.,
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558 ("NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals
for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural"); Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 401-02, 406 n.15 (1976) (choosing procedural precision over
substantive authority); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (showing defer-
ence to the CEQ to avoid substantive judicial activism); Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989) (reaffirming that NEPA is essentially proce-
dural). Although the language of NEPA suggests a constitutional mandate, the
Supreme Court regards it as merely a statute that heeds the authority of other con-
flicting statutes. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973); Flint Ridge Dev. Co.
v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787-788 (1976). Contra CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15040(c) (1990) (environmental policy supplements other laws).
13. See generclly Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
All these cases support the Supreme Court's focus on procedural aspects rather than
substantive aspects of NEPA.
14. See supra note 12. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4332; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000;
N.Y. CONsERv. LAW § 8-0101; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.010.
15. See infra notes 24-98 and accompanying text (discussing those definitions as
applied in CEQA).
16. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 12:01 (1984).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added). CEQ offers specific definitions of
what constitutes legislation and what constitutes a major federal action. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1508.17, 1508.18 (1991). The Council provides an extensive outline delineating the
appropriateness of an environmental impact statement. See Id. § 1502.
18. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
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must prepare an environmental impact statement.19 NEPA demands
that every federal agency prepare a statement on any legislation or
activity having a significant effect on the "quality of the human envi-
ronment." 20 Following the environmental assessment, the agency
may also determine that the action will not have a significant effect
on the environment and issue a "finding of no significant effect."2 '
In that case, the agency must still make an assessment of the envi-
ronmental impact.22 The assessment merely suggests procedures for
an environmentally conscious project during the planning stages and
fosters NEPA compliance. 23 These federal procedures have guided
state legislatures with the fundamentals of instituting their respec-
tive environmental policies.
III. CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
NEPA led to the adoption of many state environmental policies.24
Although the procedures outlined in the state doctrines model
NEPA, the state goals envision environmental consciousness within
its boundaries rather than attempting to cure the world's environ-
mental problems.25 Unlike the federal courts in NEPA decisions,
state courts have embraced environmental policies by promoting judi-
cial interpretation. Furthermore, state courts, in contrast to federal
courts, have performed a pivotal function in the development of sub-
stantive state environmental policies.
A. The Statute
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) defines its pur-
19. 1& §§ 1501.3, 1501.4. Often, the agency prepares an environmental assessment
and then determines that the project requires an environmental impact statement. See
I& § 1501.4(c).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added). CEQ provides a detailed definition of
what constitutes "significance" with considerations of both context and intensity. 40
C.F.R. § 1508.27.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e). Some state statutes, guidelines and regulations refer to
"a finding of no significant effect" as a negative declaration or a determination of non-
significance. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21064.
22. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
23. Id at § 1508.9(a)(2).
24. Such states include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia,
Washington and Wisconsin. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 12:02.
25. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332; CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000; CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 14, § 15002 (1990). The California Public Resources Code authorizes the Office of
Planning and Research to prepare and develop the Guidelines for Implementation of
the California Environmental Quality Act (Guidelines) to assist in CEQA's interpreta-
tion. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21083, 21087 (West 1986); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15000 (1990). While the Guidelines state that they bind all state agencies, the courts
have yet to embrace the absolute authority of the Guidelines. See Laurel Heights Im-
provement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 282 n.2
(Cal. 1988).
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pose as follows: (1) To inform the public of a proposed project's sig-
nificant adverse effects on the environment; (2) to identify potential
solutions to those adverse effects; (3) to prevent the potential envi-
ronmental harm by suggesting alternatives and mitigating factors to
the project; and (4) to publicize the reasons the agency approved the
project.26 In contrast to the policies of the federal statute, state agen-
cies may reasonably achieve these narrow, yet effective, policies.
However, in California, the procedural aspects of CEQA inhibit the
attainment of policy goals.
CEQA, instituted eight months after NEPA, provides for a three-
step analysis of a proposed activity.27 The agency first determines
whether CEQA should govern the activity. If the activity absolutely
will not significantly affect the environment or the activity falls
under one of the exemptions, then CEQA requires no further re-
view.28 Otherwise the agency conducts a preliminary review of an ac-
tivity, its permits, and other use entitlements29 to determine whether
the activity might have a significant effect on the environment.30
Second, in the event that an agency finds no relevant exemptions
and a fair argument exists as to potential adverse environmental ef-
26. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(a).
27. See Daniel P. Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmen-
tal Quality Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197, 203-04 (1984).
28. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(k)(1). The legislature creates exemptions and
the courts will not imply an exemption unless a statute specifically provides for the
exemption. See Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities, 787 P.2d 976, 978-79
(Cal. 1990) (legislature can create exemption even if it conflicts with the purpose of
CEQA); Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 553 P.2d 537, 539 (Cal. 1976) (courts will not im-
ply exemption without statutory authority). Exemptions include activities not projects
under section 15378 definition, statutory exemptions, and categorical exemptions. CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15061. Statutory exemptions include ministerial projects (projects
which the agency must accept or deny, in other words, it requires no discretion), CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(b)(1); projects outside California, id. § 21080(b)(15); emer-
gencies, id §§ 21172, 21080(b)(2)-(4); school closings, id. § 21080.18; see, e.g., East Penin-
sula Educ. Council, Inc. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., 258 Cal. Rptr.
147, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (school closing exempt because the resulting changes fall
under categorical exemption). See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, The California
Environmental Quality Act Critical Issues, Recent Developments, and Litigation
Trends, REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 14-21 (1991) [hereinafter CONTIN-
UING EDUCATION]. Categorical exemptions include small development and construc-
tion projects, land use regulation, protection of natural resources, small energy
projects, organizing government agencies, government operations, regulatory activities
by government agencies, information collection and facilities for public gatherings.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 §§ 15301-28. See CONTINUING EDUCATION, supra, at 20-21.
29. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15060.
30. Id. § 15063(a).
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fects of a project,3 1 the agency prepares an initial study as to the sig-
nificance of the effects.32 If it determines that the activity will not
significantly affect the environment, the agency prepares a negative
declaration attesting to that fact.33
Third, if the agency determines that the project might have a sig-
nificant effect, it must prepare an environmental impact report.3 4
CEQA requires that all state entities prepare an environmental im-
pact report on any "project" which may have a "significant effect on
the environment."35 An agency has the duty to mitigate all signifi-
cant effects to the level of insignificances 6 If the agency finds it im-
possible to mitigate the significant effects, it must provide overriding
considerations that mandate approval of the project.3 7 In essence, an
agency has the substantive power to deny a project solely because of
the significant environmental impact.38 However, some authorities
feel that mitigating measures and overriding considerations act as an
added procedural step that finalizes the review process.3 9 In other
words, agencies will either mitigate an environmental impact or find
an overriding consideration for the project approval and do not prac-
tically institute a final mandate to deny a project.40 Thus, many au-
thorities stress that CEQA's environmental review process merely
informs the public of possible environmental impacts, rather than
providing a clear, substantive authority to deny a project.41
31. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529 P.2d 66, 77 (Cal. 1974); Sundstrom v.
County of Mendocino, 248 Cal. Rptr. 352, 360-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
32. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 14, § 15063(a).
33. Id. § 15063(b)(2).
34. Id. § 15063(b)(1).
35. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 1986).
36. Id. §§ 21002, 21081; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15002(a)(3), 15021(a)(2),
15091(a). See also Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, 271 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (agency not required to deny project if it shows mitigation of effect on rare
endangered species even though its perpetuation not guaranteed); Kings County Farm
Bureau v. City of Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 656 Cal. Ct. App. (1990) (court will not
pass on the environmental findings of the agency, only whether it adequately ad-
dressed the relevant material).
37. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21083, 21087; CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 14, §§ 15093,
15043(b). The overriding considerations were not included in the original CEQA
statute.
38. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15042.
39. Telephone Interview with Professor Hap Dunning, University of California at
Davis (April 6, 1992). See San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Friends of Gill, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (the agency must use its substantive authority with
caution so as not to invoke inverse condemnation).
40. Interview with Patrick Mitchell, an Associate with Gresham, Varner, Savage,
Nolan & Tilden in San Bernardino, California (March 31, 1992). Mr. Mitchell concen-
trates on environmental law and is extremely knowledgeable in the CEQA process.
41. See William L. Waterhouse, California Environmental Quality Act Update,
327 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, REAL ESTATE LAw AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK,
473 (March 1, 1989) ("CEQA is viewed... as a procedural statute which requires prep-
aration of an EIR as an informational document, not as a document which mandates a
particular project decision.").
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Initial problems arise in the interpretation of what constitutes a
"project" and "significant effect" under the statute. The California
Code of Regulations defines both "project" and "significant effect."42
While the Code has given only theoretical and vague applications of
these definitions to a proposed activity, the courts and the legislature
have struggled to define a cohesive scheme that efficiently guides a
project in its environmentally conscious development.43 The legisla-
ture has codified several holdings of the judiciary which further
broaden CEQA and add to its complexity.44 In all, the combined leg-
islative and judicial procedures for implementing environmental pol-
icy has merely delayed and increased the costs of environmentally
conscious action, rather than promoting environmental quality.45
Ironically, in contrast to NEPA,46 the state statute delineates a viable
policy, but fails to procedurally institute its policy goals.
B. State Cases Interpreting and Developing CEQA
The vague statutory language of CEQA necessitated further judi-
cial development of the act.47 Not only did the vague language result
in immediate and frequent litigation to determine the statute's scope,
but it elicited resounding criticism of frivolous lawsuits brought
under definitional guise.48 Public interest groups as well as con-
42. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15000-15387. Section 21065 of CEQA defines
project as
(a) [a]ctivities directly undertaken by any public agency, (b) [a]ctivities under-
taken by a person which are supported in whole or in part through contracts,
grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public
agencies, or (c) [a]ctivities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit,
license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public
agencies.
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21065. Section 15382 of the California Code of Regulations de-
fines a "significant effect" as a "substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change
in any of the physical conditions within the area affected by the project including land,
air, water, mineral, flora, fauna, ambient noise, and objects of historic or aesthetic sig-
nificance." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15382.
43. See infra notes 43-94 and accompanying text. But see Selmi, supra note 27, at
286 (stating that the courts have successfully "delineated the parameters of an Act no-
table for containing a host of vague terms").
44. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15301-28.
45. See infra notes 242-84 and accompanying text (an empirical study of CEQA
and current problems with the statute).
46. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text (outlining the procedural aspects
of NEPA).
47. See Selmi, supra note 27.
48. Id at 199 (citing Ashby, Developers Back Proposals to Alter Environmental
Act, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 24, 1983, at 1, col.6). See Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 553 P.2d
537 (Cal. 1976); Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Commission of Ventura County,
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cerned private citizens have instituted litigation on issues mainly in-
volving what constitutes a "project" and what constitutes a
"significant effect" under CEQA.49 These two issues basically deter-
mine when an agency must prepare an environmental impact report.
Making these determinations often confuses the significance of fu-
ture projects, cumulative impacts, long-term effects and other specu-
lative concepts that foster CEQA's complicated procedures. A review
of the judicial development reveals the initial criticisms and the pres-
ent confusion, both of which evolve from the multitude of decisions
involving the definitions and interpretations of "project" and, more
importantly, "significant effect."
1. What constitutes a project under CEQA?
The California Supreme Court first addressed CEQA in the semi-
nal decision, Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors.50 The
court addressed the issue of whether CEQA applied to a private party
seeking a conditional use and building permit from a state agency.5 '
In Fiends of Mammoth, a private party sought an application for the
permits required to build a multi-story housing and condominium
complex.52 The Mono County Planning Commission subsequently
approved the application.53 Plaintiffs, intending to protect their
small community, objected to the approval on the grounds that the
project would create water and sewage problems within the area.54
They contended that the Commission invalidly issued the permit55
The court agreed with the plaintiffs in holding that the issuance of a
use permit to a private party constituted a "project" under the statu-
tory language of CEQA.56
Prior to Fiends of Mammoth, CEQA gave no definition of "pro-
529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1974);
Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal.
1972). In order to prevent the frivolous lawsuits, opponents of CEQA unsuccessfully
sought several refinements of the statute including "wholesale exemptions from the
Act's environmental impact reporting mandate and fundamental changes in litigation
procedures, such as requiring plaintiffs to post bonds in CEQA lawsuits or imposing
liability for attorney's fees on an unsuccessful plaintiff." Selmi, supra note 27, at 199.
While the legislature rejected these solutions, they did adopt other, less drastic revi-
sions. See id. at 199-200 n.10. See infra notes 242-65 and accompanying text for illustra-
tions of how adversarial groups use CEQA to fight disfavored projects on non-
environmental grounds.
49. See infra notes 50-147 and accompanying text (cases discussing how courts
have defined "project" and "significant effect").
50. 502 P.2d 1049.
51. I& at 1052.
52. I&
53. Id.
54. I&
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1054.
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ject."5 7 The court ruled that it must interpret legislative intent
where the legislature fails to specifically set forth its intentions.58
Based on the broad intent of the legislature, the court concluded that
the statute must have contemplated that state agencies would comply
with CEQA on all matters where CEQA required the agency to make
a discretionary determination.59 Thus, instead of applying only to
government initiated projects, CEQA included private projects where
a state agency "has some minimal link with the activity, either by di-
rect proprietary interest or by permitting, regulating, or funding pri-
vate activity."6o
Friends of Mammoth had an extraordinary effect on the environ-
mental policy. CEQA's predecessor, NEPA, applied strictly to federal
agency actions.61 Now, under CEQA, any project sponsor seeking
governmental authorization had to consciously weigh environmental
concerns. While this fostered the policy of the statute, it also liberal-
ized CEQA and catalyzed its over-expansion. 62
Following the Friends of Mammoth decision, California courts
57. Id.
58. Id. The court interpreted the language of Sections 21000 and 21001 of the Act.
It found that the legislature intended Section 21000 to regulate all activities involving a
governmental agency. The specific language of the statute states: "It is the intent of
the Legislature that all agencies of the state government which regulate activities of
private individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are found to affect the
quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is
given to preventing environmental damage." CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000 (amended
1979). With the use of the word "regulation," the court determined that the legislature
"desired to ensure that governmental entities in their regulatory function would deter-
mine that private individuals were not forsaking ecological cognizance in pursuit of
economic advantage." Friends of Mammoth, 502 P.2d at 1055.
59. Friends of Mammoth, 502 P.2d at 1055. The court, in an oft-quoted portion of
its opinion, stated that "we conclude that the Legislature intended the [C]EQA to be
interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environ-
ment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language." Id. at 1056.
60. Id. at 1059. Friends of Mammoth influenced the legislature to adopt a defini-
tion of "project" in section 21065 of the California Public Resources Code, which in-
cludes private "activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license,
certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies." CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21065(c). The California Code of Regulations provides a more precise def-
inition as promulgated by Friends of Mammoth,
[a] private project means a project which will be carried out by a person other
than a governmental agency, but the project will need a discretionary ap-
proval from one or more governmental agencies for (a) a contract or financial
assistance, or (b) a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for
use.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15377.
61. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text (defining NEPA procedures).
62. See Selmi, iupra note 27, at 213-15.
1455
made increasingly broad interpretations of CEQA's scope and appli-
cation to diversified public agency decisions.63 For example, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court broadened its interpretation of a "project" in
Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Commission of Ventura
County.64 In Bozung, the City of Camarillo sought approval from the
Local Agency Formation Commission of Ventura County (LAFCO)
to annex property.65 After LAFCO approved the annexation, resi-
dents filed an action to set aside the approval on the grounds that the
annexation required an environmental impact report.6 6 The resi-
dents contended that the City contemplated future plans to develop
the property and, therefore, the possibility of development propelled
the CEQA process.6 7 In this case, the court again faced the issue of
whether this particular activity constituted a project and whether it
would have a significant effect on the environment.
In addressing whether the annexation constituted a "project," the
court relied heavily on language from the California Administrative
Code (Guidelines).68 The court, interpreting the Guideline's all-in-
clusive definition of a "project," determined that the annexation con-
stituted a "local General Plan" under which the agency must make a
significance determination.6 9 Next, the court focused on the agency's
relation to the annexation in holding that "while a general plan is by
its very nature tentative and subject to change, a LAFCO approval of
an annexation is an irrevocable step as far as that particular agency is
63. Id.
64. 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1978).
65. Id. at 1021. The county formed LAFCO, among other reasons, to approve or
disapprove city proposals to annex property into the county. Id. at 1020.
66. Id. at 1021-22.
67. Id. at 1021. The City and Kaiser Aetna planned the annexation because Kai-
ser's property fell between the City and an unincorporated area. Id. at 1020. Kaiser
planned to develop recreational, commercial and residential property, but contem-
plated no specific plans. Id. The plaintiffs relied on the language in Friends of Mam-
moth stating that CEQA should apply at the earliest possible stage of the project. Id. at
1024 (citing Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d
1049, 1056 (Cal. 1972)).
68. The California Administrative Code was renamed the California Code of Reg-
ulations. The court stated that CEQA consisted of three items: the original 1970 legis-
lation, the 1972 revisions following Friends of Mammoth and the Guidelines. Id. at
1024. While Section 21083 of the California Public Resource Code provides for the cre-
ation of the Guidelines, the courts have not consistently considered them as an omni-
present rule of law. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v.
The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 282, 293 n.2 (Cal. 1988) (whether the Guide-
lines establish regulatory mandates is an issue which the courts have yet to address);
Friends of La Vina v. Los Angeles County, 284 Cal. Rptr. 171, 175 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (same).
69. Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1027. The Guidelines delineate one definition of a "pro-
ject" as an "enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances, and the adoption of local
General Plans or elements thereof .. " CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15037.
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concerned."70 Thus, the court required the agency to treat an annex-
ation as a project under CEQA.
The Bozung court, promoting subsequent borderline decisions, took
the determination of what constitutes a "project" one step further.
In effect, the court found a "project" where no activity actually took
place.71 This decision foreshadowed the undue costs and waste re-
sulting from the improper application of CEQA requirements.72 The
Bozung court's application of CEQA is contrary to the language in
Friends of Mammoth regarding minor activities.73 The proper appli-
cation of CEQA after Friends of Mammoth should strictly read:
"CEQA applies only when a public agency directly engages in con-
struction, acquisition, or development or when it regulates private
construction, acquisition, or development."74 Therefore, the agency
would review the specific environmental effects of a project in ac-
cordance with established development plans. Preferably, CEQA
would not force an agency to make repetitive and speculative deter-
minations at every stage in which development might feasibly occur.
2. CEQA's significance determination
After expanding the definition of a project, the Friends of Mam-
moth court tackled the "significant effect" issue. The court recog-
nized that the determination of whether there is a "significant effect"
on the environment is a question of degree. 75 It emphasized that the
specific interpretation of such statutory language will arise through a
case-by-case adjudication. 76 Setting precedent for the onslaught of
70. Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1027 (citation omitted). The court found that city annexa-
tion fell under Subdivisions (a) and (c) of Section 21065 of CEQA. Id.
71. The dissent staunchly expounds that Friends of Mammoth intended that "the
EIR requirement applies only to land development and use activities, and land use reg-
ulation resulting in authorization or limitation of land use." Id. at 1035. Although the
decision applied to private projects and Bozung applies to public projects, the dissent
argues that when the court in Friends of Mammoth interpreted the scope of the stat-
ute, no intent to distinguish the boundaries of private and public projects existed. Id
at 1036.
72. See infra notes 242-65 and accompanying text (an empirical study of CEQA).
73. See supra note 60 (Friends of Mammoth interpretation of a project).
74. Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1036 (Clark, J., dissenting) (italics omitted). Justice Clark
reveals how ludicrous the Bozung case is by analogizing the majority's reasoning to re-
ceiving a driver's license. The Department of Motor Vehicles issues a driver's license
that may ultimately cause the development of land due to the need for more highways
and freeways as more drivers obtain permits. Thus, a driver's license should require
an environmental impact report. Id. at 1037 (Clark, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049,
1065 (Cal. 1972).
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CEQA cases, the Friends of Mammoth case directed that "the courts
will not countenance abuse of the 'significant effect' qualification as a
subterfuge to excuse the making of impact reports otherwise re-
quired by the act."77 Although it attempted to discourage frivolous
lawsuits by expressly stating that the decision will not impact minor
improvements to small dwellings,78 the court implicitly encouraged
subsequent litigation.79 Thus, the court's first experience with CEQA
led to broad interpretations which opened the floodgates to expansive
litigation defining the elements of CEQA.80
The most astounding effect on a significance determination came in
the California Supreme Court decision No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los An-
geles.8' In No Oil, the City of Los Angeles decided not to prepare an
environmental impact report before enacting zoning ordinances
which would allow exploratory oil drilling in Pacific Palisades.82 The
plaintiffs sought to invalidate the ordinances because the City failed
to prepare an impact report regarding the significant effects that fu-
ture drilling might have on the environment if the drilling company
struck oil.83 The defendants argued that they could not calculate the
significant environmental effects of the drilling until they received
the exploration results.8 4 Thus, the court had to decide whether the
City possessed sufficient and relevant data to submit a reliable envi-
ronmental impact report.8 5
The court followed the Friends of Mammoth holding in reinforcing
the wide latitude given to significant impact determinations.8 6 It ac-
knowledged that the word "significant" contained a multitude of
meanings that a court must address.87 In reiterating the language of
77. Id.
78. Id The court focused on the language of the statute which requires an envi-
ronmental impact report when an activity "may" or "could" have a significant impact
on the environment. Id
79. See Waterhouse, supra note 41.
80. But see infra notes 284-301 and accompanying text (courts showing an intoler-
ance for frivolous litigation).
81. 529 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1974).
82. Id. at 69.
83. Id at 71-72.
84. Id at 72.
85. Id.
86. Id at 76. Initially, the court determined that even if the city did not find a
significant impact, it must make a written declaration to that fact-a Negative Declara-
tion. Id at 73.
87. Id at 76. No Oil provides background for these meanings:
As stated by Judge Friendly, construing the phrase 'significantly affecting
quality of the human environment' in NEPA: 'While ... determination of the
meaning of 'significant' is a question of law, one must add immediately that to
make this determination on the basis of the dictionary would be impossible.
Although all words may be 'chameleons, which reflect the color of their envi-
ronment,' 'significant' has that quality more than most. It covers a spectrum
ranging from 'not trivial' through 'appreciable' to 'important' and even 'mo-
mentous.'" Id at 76 n.16 (citations omitted).
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Friends of Mammoth, the court wrestled with the breaking point
where an activity encompasses a possible significant harm to the en-
vironment.88 No Oil ultimately broadened the scope of the term "sig-
nificant effect" in two ways that encouraged subjective
interpretation. First, the court held that a government agency must
consider preliminary projects and their short-term effects when sub-
stantial evidence shows a fair argument that the project might have a
significant effect on the environment, regardless of its permanence
and duration.89 Second, the court noted that public controversy alone
sufficiently demonstrates the need for an environmental impact re-
port, even though an opposing party may fabricate widespread public
controversy to achieve adverse results.90 Nevertheless, the court felt
that any public controversy signified the need for a report.91
Like No Oil, the Bozung court turned to Friends of Mammoth in
deciding the significant effect issue.92 Analogizing the annexation to
the conditional use permit in Friends of Mammoth, the court in
Bozung stated that the project need not have a direct effect on the
environment. 93 Rather, the project only needs to "culminat[e] in
physical changes to the environment." 94 Furthermore, even though
the City had not made concrete plans for the use of the annexed
88. Id. at 76. The court quoted language used by the Friends of Mammoth court in
describing the latitude of a "project" definition: "Mhe Legislature intended [CEQA]
to be interpreted in such a manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the
environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language." Id. (quoting
Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056
(Cal. 1972)). Other courts previously applied the language to "significant effect." See
County of Inyo v. Yorty, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist., 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972).
89. No Oil, 529 P.2d at 77 (quoting Yort, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 387).
90. Id. at 77-78. The court emphasized that an environmental impact report noti-
fies the public that the government agency has considered the effects the project will
have on the community and that a Negative Declaration does not adequately serve this
purpose. Id. at 78.
91. The couri. failed to quantify what constituted a public controversy. Subse-
quently, one court of appeal interpreted Section 21082.2 of the Public Resource Code to
mean that "[t]he existence of a public controversy over the environmental effects of a
project shall not require preparation of an environmental impact report if there is no
substantial evidence before the agency that the project may have a significant effect on
the environment." Citizens Ass'n for a Sensible Dev. v. County of Inyo, 217 Cal. Rptr.
893, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). This is the current state of the law. See CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 14, § 15064(h).
92. Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n of Ventura County, 529 P.2d 1017
(Cal. 1978).
93. Id at 1027-28.
94. Id. at 1028 (quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono
County, 502 P.2d 1.049, 1061 (Cal. 1972)).
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land, the court held that an agency must prepare an environmental
impact statement at the earliest possible stage of the project
development. 95
As the dissent in Bozung adamantly pointed out, this case illus-
trates the problems with CEQA interpretation.96 The court reck-
lessly subjected property acquisition to CEQA regulations under the
guise of policy, even though the acquisition revealed no consequential
effect to the environment.97 In contrast, even though Friends of
Mammoth applied CEQA to a private action, it did so in a land use
situation.98
3. Subsequent application of California Supreme Court cases by
the Courts of Appeal
A quick review of important courts of appeal cases illustrates the
historical confusion leading to the present issues facing today's courts
in interpreting CEQA. In sum, while courts generally do not chal-
lenge the definition of a "project,"9 9 the "significant effect" threshold
has given the judiciary considerable problems with consistency. 100
One problem stems from the amount of discretion each agency has in
determining what constitutes a "significant effect." CEQA gives
broad guidelines which require an inquiry into all potential impacts
including direct, indirect, secondary, consequential, future, cumula-
tive and growth-inducing impacts, as well as public controversy.' 0 '
Another problem has been defining the "fair argument" standard for
finding a significant impact. Some courts liberally apply the standard
95. Id. at 1030. The court emphasized that approval of an annexation is not a fu-
ture action, but a present reality. The court solidified its decision on the preliminary
plans of development by the City and Kaiser. Id. at 1029.
96. Id. at 1035 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Obviously, the Legislature did not intend
CEQA to apply to such decisions, and any construction requiring this application
would be absurd.").
97. See Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1035 (Clark, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1035 (Clark, J., dissenting). See also Friends of Mammoth, 502 P.2d at
1063-66.
99. See Selmi, supra note 27, at 217-19. This is not to say that a creative approach
to project definitions would not help to ease the controversial significance determina-
tion. See infra notes 310-21 and accompanying text.
100. Recently, one court found that the definition of significance requires agencies
to apply discretionary standards. See Citizen Action to Serve All Students v. Thornley,
272 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Even though the Public Resources Code de-
fines "significant effect" as having a substantial effect on the environment (Section
21068), in Friends of Mammoth, the court set a precedent that requires an agency to
prepare an environmental impact report when a project "could" have a significant ef-
fect. See CONTINUING EDUCATION, supra note 28. Since the California Supreme Court
has not overruled or modified Friends of Mammoth, it remains unclear what threshold
to apply or how to define each threshold.
101. See generally CAL. PUB. RFs. CODE §§ 21000-21190.
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to encompass a broad range of impacts102 while other courts have
tried to narrow the standard.10 3 Currently, the California judicial
districts are divided on the exact application of the "fair argument
standard."104
The opinion in No Oil,105 which set the parameters for a signifi-
cance determination, influenced the California Court of Appeal deci-
sion in Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino.10 6 In Sundstrom, a
motel owner sought a use permit to build a private sewage treatment
plant. 0 7 A nearby small town, with existing sewage problems, op-
posed the permit because it might affect the town's ability to gener-
ate support for a public sewage treatment plant.108 The Planning
Commission issued a negative declaration with attached mitigating
conditions on the proposal to build the private sewage plant.1 9
The Sundstrom court held, under the two significance tests enunci-
ated in No O/i,110 that substantial evidence of a fair argument com-
pels an agency to issue an environmental impact report, but that in
some cases the court could show the existence of a fair argument on
limited facts.i'' First, by failing to present concrete facts that a pro-
ject will not significantly impact the environment, one could infer
from the absence of substantial evidence that a fair argument ex-
ists.112 Second, the court determined that the agency must consider
public controversy in marginal cases where the evidence fails to
clearly show a significant effect on the environment.113 This inter-
pretation, currently the prevailing law, narrowed the public contro-
versy issue. Now the establishment of a controversy must be based
102. See, e.g., Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514, 523-24
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
103. See Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County v. Sacramento Local Agency
Formation Comm'n, 286 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
104. See infra note 290 (citing cases that delineate the discrepancy in interpretation
of "fair argument").
105. 529 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1974).
106. 248 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
107. Id, at 354.
108. Id. at 356.
109. I. at 355-56. The opponents filed suit on grounds that the agency failed to
properly review the environmental impact of the project. Id. at 356.
110. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing the "fair argument"
and "public controversy" standards).
111. Id, at 361. The court explained that the burden of environmental investigation
should be on the government and not on the public. Id
112. 1I.
113. Id,
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on environmental concerns. 114 In Sundstrom, the evidence did not
substantially reveal a significant impact on the environment. Rather,
in the minds of the small community, it jeopardized the viability of a
public sewage plant. Furthermore, future speculative impacts cre-
ated doubt as to the project's overall environmental impact.1 5
While the result shows the inadequacy of report drafting, it also
reveals the potential abuse of the significance standard. Further-
more, the California judicial districts have failed to adopt a consistent
approach to the "fair argument" test.1 16
Another problem with CEQA arose soon after Bozung, in Simi
Valley Recreation and Park District v. Local Agency Formation
Commission.117 Simi Valley revealed problems in defining "pro-
ject."11S The court retreated from the Bozung decision in deciding
whether a property detachment constituted a project. It stated that
LAFCO's decision to detach land from the Park and Recreation Dis-
trict would not physically change the use of the land.119 Following
Friends of Mammoth, the court held that an activity must have some
minimal link with governmental activity which promotes a physical
change in the use of the land to constitute a project.' 20 It also distin-
guished Bozung's definitionl2l of a project in several ways: (1) the
court in Bozung stated that it based its decision on a unique fact sce-
nario; (2) in Bozung, the decision of LAFCO was deciding whether
any development on the land would ensue, whereas in Simi Valley,
no development concerns existed; and (3) Bozung constituted a dis-
cretionary project in contrast to the ministerial project in Simi
114. 1d. See infra note 243 (discussing the elements of public controversy and con-
troversy between experts).
115. 1I at 357-59.
116. See infra note 290 (citing differing cases). See, e.g., Sacramento County Bd. of
Supervisors v. Sacramento Local Form. Comm'n, 286 Cal. Rptr. 171, 182 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) ("[c]ourt determines only whether there is a fair argument of a significant envi-
ronmental impact, not whether there actually is or is not an impact").
117. 124 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
118. See Selmi, supra note 27, at 217 (the determination of whether an annexation
constitutes a project creates particular problems). Selmi states that not only does a
broad application of CEQA create increased bureaucratic responsibility, but "the inter-
pretation of project by the supreme court requires public agencies to examine almost
every action they take for possible environmental consequences." Id, at 215. See also
City of Redding v. Shasta County Local Agency Form. Comm'n, 257 Cal. Rptr. 793,
795-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (LAFCO decision not a project); City of Agoura Hills v. Lo-
cal Agency Form. Comm'n, 243 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (LAFCO de-
cision not a project); City of Livermore v. Local Agency Form. Comm'n, 230 Cal. Rptr.
867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (LAFCO revision held a project); People ex. rel. Younger v.
Local Agency Form. Comm'n, 146 Cal. Rptr 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (annexations and
de-annexations held as projects).
119. Simi Valley, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
120. 1& See also Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 502
P.2d 1049, 1065-66 (Cal. 1972).
121. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussion of the Bozung
interpretation).
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Valley.12 2
While the proper CEQA interpretation unfolded in Simi Valley,
the case further revealed the inconsistency of CEQA. Essentially,
the detachment process mirrored the annexation process. In both sit-
uations, the owners contemplated development on the land without
specific plans; LAFCO made a final decision as it pertained to that
government agency; and LAFCO's decision had no foreseeable effect
on the environment. Therefore, the courts should have reached the
same result, but the problems surrounding CEQA's definitions and
implementation prevailed.
Serious problems also arise when courts attempt to consistently ap-
ply a "significant effect" threshold. The problem centers on whether
an agency must prepare an environmental impact report that con-
templates possible future development, either of unknown type or
scope. Early cases attempted to consistently apply the California
Code of Regulations Guideline for Implementing CEQA while inter-
preting the initial supreme court precedents, particularly the No Oil
standards. 123
The California Court of Appeal for the Second District, in one of
the earliest decisions outlining the requirement of future develop-
ments in an environmental impact report, seemed undaunted by
Bozung.'24 In Topanga Beach, the court held that the State's acquisi-
tion of beachfront property and displacement of renters did not en-
compass a significant effect on the environment, even though the
State planned -to demolish the existing structures. 125
Like in Bozung, the State ultimately planned to develop the
land.126 The court stated that undetermined and uncertain develop-
ment does not create a possibility of a significant effect on the envi-
ronment and that requiring an agency to prepare an environmental
impact report would engender speculation.127
In Lake County Energy Council v. County of Lake, the court also
122. Simi Valley, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47. The court further distinguished Bozung
by stating that LAFCO essentially provided the City of Camarillo with a use entitle-
ment. But see Boaung, 529 P.2d at 1036 (Clark, J., dissenting).
123. See Laurel. Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d
278, 293 n.2 (Cal. 1988).
124. Topanga Beach Renters Ass'n v. Department of Gen. Serv., 129 Cal. Rptr. 739
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
125. Id. at 743.
126. Although the State never expressly stated any plans, one could speculate that
the state had bought the beachfront property with plans of developing or selling the
land for profit.
127. Id at 743.
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disregarded past authority.' 28 The court held that a speculative activ-
ity does not constitute a significant effect on the environment at the
initial stage of development.129 The Lake County Energy Council
planned to perform exploratory drilling in search of geothermal re-
sources.1 30 Since the Council could not effectively determine the im-
pact of a successful exploration program nor counterbalance those
impacts with the benefits derived, the court found that an environ-
mental impact must include the initial short-term impact.' 3 ' How-
ever, the court determined that the possible subsequent impacts from
future development must await the outcome of the exploration. 3 2
The court of appeal strayed from the supreme court decision in No
Oil, even though the courts heard similar facts. 33 Commercial devel-
opment often does not follow exploratory drilling. While the actual
exploration does reveal a need for an impact report due to possible
adverse effects,134 many administrative decisions, financial considera-
tions and possible environmental concerns follow a successful explo-
ration program. Thus, an impact report at the earliest stage in this
scenario proves wasteful and costly, despite the considerations re-
ferred to in No Oil.135
McQueen v. Board of Directorsi presented a more liberal inter-
pretation of the Bozung argument in deciding whether a "significant
effect" exists when a local government agency acquires property. In
McQueen, the Board of Directors sought to buy two parcels of land
from the federal government. 3 7 The land included transformers
that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).138 The federal gov-
ernment took responsibility for the removal and disposal of the the
transformers. 139 In the interim, the Board of Directors stored the
PCBs, but made no specific plans for the land's use nor did they
adopt plans for the disposal of the PCBs.140 The court held that the
Board of Directors could not acquire land containing PCBs without
an environmental impact report.' 4 '
128. 139 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1977).
129. Id at 179.
130. Id at 177.
131. Id
132. Id The court stated that the exploratory drilling was a necessary precedent to
a large scale project and the overall impact of a commercial project was key to their
decision of allowing the exploratory drilling. Id.
133. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (entire discussion of No Oil).
134. The digging could cause land subsidence or other environmental harms such as
sliding.
135. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (entire discussion of No Oil).
136. 249 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
137. Id. at 441.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 442.
141. Id. at 445.
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Initially, the court determined that the acquisition of land with
PCBs falls under the early courts' broad interpretation of a "pro-
ject." 42 Next, the court found that an acquisition of property con-
taining PCBs unequivocally might have a significant impact on the
environment even though the Board had no immediate plans for the
land's use.143 It expressed concern over the inadequate consideration
of toxic waste regulations before the Board of Directors adopted the
project.'" The court also rejected the Board of Directors' argument
that it delegated responsibility to the federal government as a former
property owner.145
With Bozung as its precedent, the court categorized an acquisition
of property causing no physical change to the environment as having
a significant effect on the environment.146 It disregarded the actual
effect the acquisition had on the environment and focused on the pos-
sibility that the acquisition might eventually result in a physical
change.147 Requiring an environmental impact at the stage of acqui-
sition established a restraint on property rights and promoted unwar-
ranted paperwork and costs just because the court had reservations
regarding the nature of the property. Although many of these cases
possess detailed and peculiar factual distinctions, the courts, such as
in McQueen, have prematurely and arbitrarily applied CEQA to ques-
tionable cases. The result is a failure to provide any concrete
message as to when environmental impact reports are required. This
creates confusion which allows project opponents ample opportunity
to force an undesirable project into the judicial system, thereby in-
creasing costs and delays.
Allowing the judiciary to cure the ills of CEQA consumes an inor-
dinate amount of time and fails to deter project opponents from as-
serting controversial pressure on project sponsors before the
142. Id. at 443. The court felt that the Board of Directors attempted to divide its
acquisition of the land into segments in order to skirt the project definition. It stated,
"A narrow view of a project could result in the fallacy of division that is, overlooking
its cumulative impact by separately focusing on isolated parts of the whole." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
143. Id. at 444. Had the Board included a plan for disposing of the waste it neces-
sarily would have to prepare an environmental impact report regarding the plan. The
court found that the Board would eventually have to adopt a plan for the disposal and,
thus, could not break up the project by separating the acquisition from the disposal
plan. Id
144. Id.
145. Id at 445.
146. Id. at 447.
147. Id. (citing Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1035).
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argument reaches the courtroom. Unfortunately, the legislature
must amend the statute to more efficiently prevent the institution of
actions based on non-environmental concerns. While previous
amendments to the California statute codified judicial interpretations
of CEQA, sister states' statutes may provide competent methods of
attaining greater proficiency in the implementation of CEQA.
IV. COMPARATIVE STATE POLICIES
All the states adopting environmental policy acts modeled their
statutes after NEPA, the federal environmental act.148 Moreover,
states that adopted the policies of earlier statutes incorporated the
successes and avoided the failures attributed to the prior statutes.
While recent state statutes encompass the experiences of early envi-
ronmental policies, such as those in California, California and other
pioneer states need to investigate the results of sister states' interpre-
tations and incorporate the beneficial experiences into their individ-
ual statutes. Even though states have competing concerns in much of
their legislation, these same states consistently and systematically de-
rive similar substantive goals in their environmental policy acts.
Since New York's State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA) and Washington's State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)
generate the most litigation and support, this article will analyze the
two statutes and the strengths that could enhance CEQA's support.
A. New York
New York's SEQRA became effective on November 1, 1978,
roughly eight years after the adoption of NEPA, California's CEQA,
and Washington's SEPA.149 By this time, Congress and the legisla-
tures of California and Washington had worked out the initial rough
areas in their respective statutes. In fact, California had already
amended CEQA once.150 This allowed New York the opportunity to
bypass some trial and error in their initial document.151 Therefore,
148. MANDELKER, supra note 16, § 12:01.
149. Id. § 12:04.
150. Nicholas A. Robinson, SEQRA's Siblings: Precedents From Little NEPA's in
the Sister States, 46 ALBANY L. REV. 1155, 1160 (1982).
151. See Koppell, Environmental Protection Laws At Issue, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1976 at
1. Assemblyman Oliver Koppel, chairman of the New York State Assembly Environ-
mental Conservation Committee, solicited reports from sister state officials including
Nicholas Yost, chief at the California Office of Environmental Protection. Yost con-
cluded that CEQA enjoyed early success and that the noted fears of increased litiga-
tion never surfaced nor did the fear of delaying projects for unnecessary reasons. Id.
at 4. Koppel concluded that
we do have substantial information in the experience of California, a state
which has had such a law since 1970. The states (California and New York)
have much in common, apart from the fact that much of the New York act is
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New York adopted its statute with reference to other state exper-
iences, but adapted the document to the peculiar needs of New York.
Likewise, by reviewing SEQRA and applying its provisions to the
critical needs of CEQA, the California legislature could improve
CEQA's functional efficiency.
1. To what types of projects does SEQRA apply?
Following the lead of CEQA, the New York legislature established
that SEQRA applies to any action that a state or local agency pro-
poses or approves.152 The project need not fall in the high threshold
category as adopted by NEPA.l53 Rather, SEQRA applies to any pro-
patterned on the earlier California model. Both states are large, populous and
diverse.
Id at 1.
In a separate opinion, Philip Weinberg, the head of the Environmental Protection
Bureau in the New York State Attorney General's Office, commented on the initiation
of SEQRA:
SEQRA had as its model [NEPAl, which since January 1, 1970 has required
every federal agency performing, permitting or funding any major action with
a substantial impact on the environment to weigh the environmental effects
of its action and to prepare an environmental impact statement-to look, in
short, before it leaps, or permits someone else to. Even more in point, a
number of states, notably California and Washington, had also enacted envi-
ronmental impact laws with parallel mandates. Our Legislature adapted these
laws to New York's needs, requiring the state, localities and private businesses
acting under state or local permit or funding to consider the impact of their
action on the environment and to document that consideration by furnishing a
reviewable record.
Robinson, supra note 150, at 1161 (citing Philip Weinberg, What Every Real Estate
Lawyer Should Know About New York's SEQRA, 52 N.Y.S.B.J. 110 (1977)).
152. N.Y. ENvT. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(4). The statute reads:
Actions include:
(i) projects or activities directly undertaken by any agency; or projects or ac-
tivities supported in whole or in part through contracts, grants, subsidies,
loans, or other forms of funding assistance from one or more agencies; or
projects or activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit li-
cense, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act by one or
more agencies;
(ii) policy, regulations and procedure-making.
The statute also includes activities which are not considered actions;
Actions do not include;
(i) enforcement proceedings or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in de-
termining whether or not to institute such proceedings;
(ii) official acts of a ministerial nature, involving no exercise of discretion;
(iii) maintenance or repair involving no substantial changes in existing struc-
ture or facility.
Id. at § 8-0105(5).
153. NEPA applies to major projects undertaken by the federal government. 42
U.S.C. § 102(2)(c) (West 1992). Some courts interpreted the language "major" to be sy-
nonymous with "significance," thereby downplaying the importance of major projects.
See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
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ject which a government agency undertakes or approves. Therefore,
as set forth in California's Friends of Mammoth, SEQRA applies to
all public projects, as well as private projects, which sought approval
from a government agency.154
Straying from the California statute, the New York legislature ex-
panded on CEQA's concept of "projects" by explicitly defining and
categorizing types of projects subject to, or not subject to, an environ-
mental impact statement. 5 5 The New York State Department of En-
vironmental Conservation proffered these definitions in a body of
regulations similar to the CEQA Guidelines.l56 The detailed discus-
sion of "projects" helps temper the burdensome task of a significance
determination and the inconsistency involved when attempting to
grasp a meaningful definition of significance. 157
While California merely lists various exemptions to CEQA,158
SEQRA groups projects into several categories: Type 1,159 Type I1,160
unlisted,161 exempted 6 2 and excluded.163 Each category requires a
different level of review according to its potential effects on the envi-
ronment. An agency must presume that a Type I action will defi-
nitely have a significant impact on the environment.5 4 Type II
Other courts apply a divided and narrower interpretation. See National Ass'n for the
Advancement of Colored People v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3rd Cir. 1978).
154. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-105(4)(ii).
155. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 617.12 (1987). These regulations also ex-
pand the statutory definition of a project. Id. § 617.2(b).
156. See N.Y. CONSERV. LAw § 8-0113 (authorizing the Department of Environmen-
tal Conservation to adopt SEQRA rules and regulations).
157. See infra notes 310-321 and accompanying text (recommendations for narrow-
ing the project determination).
158. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussion of California project
determination).
159. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.12.
160. rd § 617.13.
161. Unlisted actions obviously do not have a definitional category, but the regula-
tions refer to them in Section 617.12. Id § 617.12.
162. Id. § 617.2(q). The statute also defines exempt actions as non-actions. N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 8-105(5). See supra note 152.
163. N.Y. CoMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.2. Excluded actions include projects
started before the initiation of SEQRA, actions under which the Public Services Law
already pertain, and actions undertaken by the Adirondack Park Agency. Id An
agency treats both the excluded actions and exemptions the same as a Type II action.
164. Section 617.12(b) lists Type I actions, but the list is not inclusive. Type I ac-
tions include:
(1) the adoption of a municipality's land use plan, the adoption by any
agency of a comprehensive resource management plan or the initial
adoption of a municipality's comprehensive zoning regulations;
(2) the adoption of changes in the allowable uses within any zoning district,
affecting 25 or more acres;
(3) the granting of a zoning change, at the request of an applicant, for an ac-
tion that meets or exceeds one or more of the thresholds given elsewhere
in this list;
(4) the acquisition, sale, lease, annexation or other transfer of 100 or more
contiguous acres of land by a State or local agency;
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actions will absolutely not have an impact on the environment and
(5) construction of new residential units which meet or exceed the following
thresholds;
(i) 10 units in municipalities which have not adopted zoning or subdivi-
sion regulations;
(ii) 50 units not to be connected (at commencement of habitation) to ex-
isting community or public water and sewerage systems including sewage
treatment works;
(iii) in a city, town or village having a population of less than 150,000:
250 units to be connected (at the commencement of habitation) to existing
community or public water and sewerage systems including sewage treat-
ment works;
(iv) in a city, town or village having a population of greater than 150,000
but less than 1,000,000: 1000 units to be connected (at the commencement
of habitation) to existing community or public water and sewetage sys-
tems including sewage treatment works; or
(v) in a city, town or village having a population of greater than
1,000,000: 2,500 units to be connected (at the commencement of habita-
tion) to existing community or public water and sewerage systems includ-
ing sewage treatment works;
(6) activities, other than the construction of residential facilities, which meet
or exceed any of the following thresholds; or the expansion of existing
non-residential facilities by more than 50 percent of any of the following
thresholds:
(i) a project or action which involves the physical alteration of 10 acres;
(ii) a project or action which would use ground or surface water in ex-
cess of 2,000,000 gallons per day;
(iii) parking for 1,000 vehicles;
(iv) in a city, town or village having a population of 150,000 persons or
less: a facility with more than 100,000 square feet of gross floor area;
(v) in a city, town or village having a population of more than 150,000
persons: a facility with more than 240,000 square feet of gross floor area;
(7) any structure exceeding 100 feet above original ground level in a locality
without any zoning regulation pertaining to height;
(8) any non-agricultural use occurring wholly or partially within an agricul-
tural district (certified pursuant to Agriculture and Markets law, article
25, section 303 and 304) which exceeds 25 percent of any threshold estab-
lished in this section;
(9) any Unlisted action (unless the action is designed for the preservation of
the facility or site) occurring wholly or partially within, or substantially
contiguous to, any historic building, structure, facility, site or district or
prehistoric site that is listed on the National Register of Historic Places,
or that has been proposed by the New York State Board on Historic
Preservation for a recommendation to the state Historic Preservation Of-
ficer for nomination for inclusion in said National Register, or that is
listed on the State Register of Historic Places (The National Register of
Historic Places is established by 36 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.)
Parts 60 and 63, 1986 (see section 617.19 of this Part).);
(10) any Unlisted action which exceeds 25 percent of any threshold in this
section, occurring wholly or partially within or substantially contiguous
to any publicly owned or operated parkland, recreation area or desig-
nated open space, including any site on the Register of National Natural
Landmarks pursuant to 36 C.F.R. Part 62, 1986 (see section 617.19 of this
Part);
(11) any Unlisted action which exceeds a Type I threshold established by an
involved agency pursuant to section 617.4 of this Part; or
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fall outside the scope of SEQRA.165 The same treatment applies to
exempted and excluded activities. 66 Unlisted actions require a sub-
stantive review, but carry no presumption of significance, as in a
Type I action.16 7
The legislature designed SEQRA to register the environmental ef-
fects of an agency action as early as possible in the "formulation of
an action it proposes to undertake, or as soon as [the agency] receives
an application for funding or approval action."168 An agency must
first determine the classification of a proposed project. The regula-
tions recognize that agencies internally categorize projects.169 If the
agency finds that a project proposed by a private party or the agency
itself falls under the Type II, exempted, or excluded list, SEQRA will
not apply.170 Thus, the agency may approve the project without ref-
(12) any Unlisted action which takes place wholly or partially within or sub-
stantially contiguous to any critical environmental area designated by a
local or state agency pursuant to section 617.4(h) of this Part.
Id. § 617.12(b).
165. Id. § 617.13.
166. Id. § 617.11.
167. Id. § 617.12(a). Type I actions are more likely to require an environmental im-
pact statement than is an unlisted action. Furthermore, a Type II listed action re-
quires a long Environmental Assessment Form (EAF), while an unlisted action
requires a short EAF.
The EAFs are widely used to provide the information upon which initial de-
termination of significance are based. The full EAF is a 13-page document
that requires more detail than required by the short form, which is a two page
document. The regulations expressly require that a full EAF be used to ascer-
tain the significance of all Type I actions, unless a draft EIS has been pre-
pared and submitted on the action by the project sponsor. Id. § 617.5(b).
Similarly, the short form EAF is generally to be used for unlisted actions. Id.
§ 617.5(c). In this case, however, agencies are granted discretion to require the
full EAF if necessary to obtain enough information to make a determination
of significance. Id.
Peter R. Paden, DEC's Part 617 Regulations, As Amended:- A Guide to the Implemen-
tation ofSEQRA, 5 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 51, 64 n.66 (1987).
168. N.Y. COMP. CODE RuLES & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(a): compare with CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 14, § 15013 ("EIRs should be prepared as early in the planning process as pos-
sible to enable environmental considerations to influence project, program or design.").
169. Id. § 617.12(a)(2). The regulations also give local agencies the power to desig-
nate areas as Critical Environmental Areas (CEA). Id § 617.4(h). The designation
skirts a formal listing of a project as a Type I action and requires "a presumption in
favor of a more searching SEQRA review for any action proposed within its bounds."
Paden, supra note 167, at 71. The regulation provides certain guidelines for a locality
to make such a designation:
To be designated a CEA, an area must be exceptional or unique as to one or more of
the factors set forth in § 617.4(h). These factors include:
(i) a benefit or threat to human health;
(ii) a natural setting (e.g. fish and wildlife habitat, forest and vegetation,
open space and areas of important aesthetic or scenic quality);
(iii) social, cultural, historic, archaeological, recreational, or educational val-
ues; or
(iv) an inherent ecological, geological or hydrological sensitivity to change
which may be adversely affected by any change.
N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(h).
170. Id. § 617.5(a)(1).
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erence to the environmental concerns outlined in SEQRA. When an
agency determines that an action falls under the Type I description,
then a high likelihood exists that a significant impact will occur upon
its approval, and thus an agency must require or prepare an environ-
mental impact statement.171
While the categorizing of projects seems time-consuming and cum-
bersome, it promotes environmental concerns and provides consis-
tency and predictability to agencies and private parties preparing to
embark on a project that needs governmental approval.172 Accord-
ingly, the legislature's extra effort curtails needless litigation, delays,
and costs incurred by agencies and private parties alike. For in-
stance, a developer can refer to the statute and sufficiently plan the
type of development he wishes to pursue and more accurately deter-
mine the possible costs and time constraints involved.
2. Significance determination and its consequences
The New York statute again follows the lead of CEQA when defin-
ing "significant effect." SEQRA requires that an agency prepare an
environmental impact statement on any action "which may have a
significant effect on the environment." 73 Certain definitions help
minimize the arbitrary determination of significance. 17 4 The defini-
tion of "environment" in SEQRA, as well as the project definitions,
mitigate the challenging significance determination. SEQRA defines
the environment as "the physical conditions which will be affected
by a proposed action, including land, air, water, minerals, flora,
fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance, visiting pat-
terns of population, concentration, distribution, or growth and ex-
isting community or neighborhood character."175 Thus, the physical
environment, as well as socioeconomic effects of an action, need
attention.
New York's highest court solidified this interpretation in Chinese
Staff & Workers Association v. City of New York. 176 In that case, the
court reviewed a negative declaration determination by two lead
agencies, the City Planning Commission and the Board of Esti-
171. Id. § 617.12(a)(1).
172. See genenrlly Paden, supra note 167, at 71-77.
173. N.Y. ENrm. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2).
174. See supra notes 152-172 and accompanying text (New York project
determination).
175. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(6) (emphasis added). The definition
seems to include many areas tested by litigation in California and Washington.
176. 502 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1986).
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mate.177 The agencies decided that a proposed high-rise luxury
apartment building in New York City's Chinatown would not have a
significant effect on the environment.178 The case turned on the pre-
cise definition of "environment." The court determined that
SEQRA's definition included socioeconomic effects affecting the com-
munity character and population patterns of the area.179 More im-
portantly, it held that these socioeconomic effects alone substantiated
the need for an environmental impact statement, notwithstanding
the lack of an actual impact on the physical environment. 8 0
An agency arrives at a significance determination through an elab-
orate, but well-defined procedural method.' 8 ' As discussed above,
the agency must first categorize the type of action.' 8 2 When the
agency determines that a project falls under the Type I or unlisted
action category, it must complete a preliminary Environmental As-
sessment Form. 8 3 The agency will use this form to make its initial
significance determination. 8 4 If the agency finds that the proposed
action might have a significant effect on the environment as provided
by the detailed definitions in the statutes and regulations, then the
agency must prepare an environmental impact statement.'i 5
The New York Supreme Court, in H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State
Urban Development Corp.,' 8 6 set the initial standards of review that
an agency must consider when determining significance. In
H.O.M.E.S., the city planning commission determined that it need not
prepare an environmental impact statement on a proposed domed
athletic facility on the Syracuse University campus.' 8 7 Opponents ar-
gued that the new stadium would have a profound effect on traffic
and parking problems in the area.'8 8 The court rejected the agency's
determination of non-significance and articulated the standard that
an agency must meet in making such a determination. 8 9
The court looked to the federal NEPA standard in adopting the
"hard look" test.190 Under this test, the agency must 1) identify rele-
177. Id at 177.
178. Id
179. Id at 180. See also Real Estate Board of New York, Inc. v. City of New York,
556 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
180. Chinese Stoff, 502 N.E. 2d at 180.
181. See N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.11(a).
182. See supra notes 152-172 and accompanying text (New York project determina-
tion and defining the Environmental Assessment Form).
183. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.21. See supra note 167.
184. Paden, supra note 167, at 64 n.66.
185. Id. at 63-64 n.66.
186. 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
187. Id. at 829.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 832.
190. Id. The court relied on the NEPA standard coined in the opinions of Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); City of Rochester v. U.S. Postal Serv., 541
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vant areas of environmental concern, 2) thoroughly analyze those ar-
eas to determine if the action may have a significant adverse impact,
and 3) support its determination with reasoned elaboration before
making a negative declaration. 191 The decision asserts that all gov-
ernment agencies act as "stewards" of the environment in making
their decisions.192
Similar to the definitional problems faced by the California courts,
subsequent decisions in New York met with confusion as to the appli-
cation of the H.O.M.E.S. standard.193 Some courts felt that the test
required the court to consider only the procedural aspects of an
agency's decision.194 Other courts demanded a more intrusive probe
into the substantive issues to assure that the agency applied the
"hard look" test.195 The New York Court of Appeals evidently pro-
vided the appropriate standard whereby the court may look into sub-
stantive issues facing the agency under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. However, other courts found that H.O.M.E.S. im-
plied a more relaxed standard by holding that the "rule of reason"
applies to agency decisions because they have wide decisional latitude
as stewards of the environment.196 While the H.O.M.E.S. decision ap-
plied to the adequacy of an environmental impact statement, it also
implied that the "hard look" test applies when determining whether
the agency must prepare the statement at all.1 9 7 Thus, a court might
reject a negative declaration if substantial evidence existed that the
agency issued the declaration arbitrarily and capriciously. 198
New York's standard highlights the confusion inherent in a signifi-
F.2d 967, 973 (2d Cir. 1976), and Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
Comm'n v. U.S. Poqtal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
191. H.O.M.ES., 418 N.Y.S.2d at 832. The negative declaration may demand miti-
gating measures which a project must satisfy. In other words, the agency issues a con-
ditional negative declaration. See N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REG. § 617.6(h).
192. H.O.M.E.S., 418 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
193. See Gail Bowers, New York's SEQRA in the Courts, 5 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 25,
30-32 (1987).
194. See Southampton Ass'n v. Planning Board, 491 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (upholding a plat approval); Soule v. Town of Colonie, 464 N.Y.S.2d 576, 579
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (upholding a negative declaration for a municipal sports sta-
dium); Cohalan v. Carey, 452 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), appeal dismissed, 439
N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 19132) (upholding conversion to a correctional facility).
195. See Aldrich v. Pattison, 486 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Inland Vale
Farm Co. v. Stergianopolous, 478 N.Y.S.2d 926 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), off'd, 481 N.E.2d
547 (N.Y. 1985) (denying a negative declaration because it merely identified the envi-
ronmental concerns rather than taking a "hard look").
196. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 436 (N.Y. 1986).
197. ld. The court implied this by affirming a lower court's decision in Aldrich.
198. Jackson, 494 N.E.2d at 267.
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cance determination. In fact, not all New York courts have consist-
ently interpreted the H.O.M.E.S. standard of review.199  This
inconsistency allows courts to determine significance on a purely bi-
ased view. What might or might not have an effect on the environ-
ment depends on many speculative factors, including cumulative
effects and future project considerations not yet ascertained.00 Thus,
one court might feel that a project has significance while another will
view the same project as non-significant.
B. Washington
While New York's statute obtained relative sophistication in its
project determination, Washington successfully prioritized its sub-
stantive policies over its policies that promote procedural exhaustion.
SEPA grants increased substantive power to the state and local agen-
cies at the cost of procedural exactitude. One author noted that the
statute
is short on process, long on substance. It is inattentive to high standards of
articulation in the statements, receptive to avoid-the-paperwork and exhaust-
proper-channels arguments. At the same time, it focuses upon results and is
unwilling to accept procedural generosity as a fair tradeoff for a polluted
stream. Slick statements are no substitutes for clean water. Washington will
be best known as the state whose SEPA elevates substance over form."2 0 1
Even though the Washington statute sacrifices procedural intrica-
cies in return for increased substantive agency power, that increased
power provides for a more efficient statute by creating greater consis-
tency and predictability, and by eliminating the undue pressure that
adversarial groups exert on project sponsors. Furthermore, the act's
cursory procedural framework also alleviates some unnecessary
disputes.
1. The procedural policies
Like California, Washington initiated its environmental policy
shortly after NEPA's introduction.202 Consequently, the Washington
legislature largely based its procedural methods on the federal
NEPA,203 rather than instituting a more expansive document as did
199. See supra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Jackson, 494 N.E.2d at 429; Chinese Staff & Workers Ass'n v. City of
New York, 502 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1986); Programming and Sys. Inc. v. New York State
Urban Dev. Corp., 460 N.E.2d 1347 (N.Y. 1984) (no EIS needed until specific project
planned).
201. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 33, 68 (1984).
202. The statute's short title is the "State Environmental Policy Act of 1971"
(SEPA). WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.900 (West 1983).
203. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text; see also MANDELKER, supra note
16, § 12:05.
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California2o4 and New York.2 05 Thus, SEPA requires an environ-
mental impact statement "on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor actions having a probable significant, adverse effect."' 206
SEPA, unlike the California and New York statutes, applies to ma-
jor projects. 2 7 Unfortunately, the statute fails to define what consti-
tutes a major project. However, the legislature has generally
categorized a project as an internal agency proposal or private par-
ties' proposals which need agency approval.208 This varies from the
more narrow NEPA definition which considers only federal agency
projects.209 Therefore, while the Washington legislature gives its
courts some latitude to define the boundaries of a major project, it
provides less latitude than the California and New York legislatures
have given their courts.2 10
204. See supra notes 25-46 and accompanying text (entire discussion of California
statute).
205. See supra notes 149-200 and accompanying text (entire discussion of New
York).
206. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.031 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. The interpretation follows largely from the language in Section 43.21C.020(3)
stating that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful envi-
ronment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation
and enhancement of the environment." Id § 43.21C.020(3). The Department of Ecol-
ogy, which published a set of SEPA rules known as the "green book," codified this
interpretation. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-714 (1989). SEPA gives the Depart-
ment of Ecology the power to establish "rules of interpretation and implementation"
to which an agency must give "substantial deference." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.21C.095. See also Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway
Comm'n, 525 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1974).
209. See supra note 17-19 and accompanying text (NEPA generally applies to major
projects).
210. See Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council,
552 P.2d 674 (Wash. 1976). The court in Norway Hill, suggesting the appropriate stan-
dard of review, artfully stated that
[i]n order to achieve this public policy it is important that an environmental
impact statement be prepared in all appropriate cases. As a result, the initial
determination by the 'responsible official,' . . . as to whether the action is a
'major action [ ] significantly affecting the environment' is very important.
The policy of the act, which is simply to ensure via a 'detailed statement' the
full disclosure of environmental information so that environmental matters
can be given proper consideration during decision making, is thwarted when-
ever an incorrect 'threshold determination' is made. The determination that
an action is not a 'major action significantly affecting the quality of the envi-
ronment' means that the detailed impact statement of SEQA is not required
before the action is taken or the decision is made. Consequently, 'without a
judicial check, the temptation would be to short-circuit the process by setting
statement thresholds as high as possible within the vague bounds of the arbi-
trary or capricious standard.'
Id at 677-78 (citations omitted).
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SEPA's significance standard more precisely follows the NEPA
definition211 than the definitions adhered to by the California and
New York statutes. Thus, the act applies to major projects that have
a "significant effect" on the environment.2 12 The Washington statute
purposefully omits specific language indicating that it governs
projects which might significantly affect the environment. Subse-
quently, the Washington Supreme Court, in Norway Hill Preserva-
tion and Protection Association v. King County Council,213
attempted to give SEPA a more interpretative definition. The court
stated that a "precise and workable definition [of significance] is elu-
sive because judgments in this area are particularly subjective-what
to one person may constitute a significant or adverse effect on the
quality of the environment may be of little or no consequences to an-
other." Thus, the court avoided a "value-laden definition of 'signifi-
cantly.' "214 However, the court did provide a more general guideline,
establishing that "the procedural requirements of SEPA... should
be invoked whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of
the environment is a reasonable probability."2 15 This definition con-
trasts with the New York and California definitions where the legis-
latures and the courts have interpreted the significance standard to
include speculative potential effects.
Adherence to the federal definitions of a major project and of a sig-
nificance determination sufficiently narrows the applicability of
SEPA by precluding agency determinations on speculative and insub-
stantial projects.2 18 Thus, an agency decides only on major projects
that will have a significant effect on the environment. Moreover,
combining New York's intricate categorization of projects with the
narrow application of significance helps filter out litigious opponents
of development. 21 7 Nevertheless, like California's CEQA, SEPA's
211. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.031.
212. In 1983, the Department of Ecology provided a more precise definition of envi-
ronment to assist in significance determinations. It provides that the environment con-
sists of both the natural and the built environment. The built environment includes
"public services and utilities (such as water, sewer, schools, and fire and police protec-
tion), transportation, environmental health (such as explosive materials and toxic
waste), and land and shoreline use (including housing, and a description of relation-
ships with land use and shoreline plans and designations including population)."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.110(f).
213. 552 P.2d 674 (Wash. 1976).
214. Id at 680.
215. I The court decided whether the development of a suburban neighborhood
in a heavily wooded area would have a significant effect on the environment. The
court concluded that the project "on its face" would have a significant effect on the
environment. I& at 680-81.
The significance determination works in concert with the judicial standard of review
discussed infra at notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
216. See Rodgers, supra note 201, at 36. See supra note 153 (explaining federal court
interpretation of major projects).
217. See supra notes 159-72.
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procedural structure leaves an opening, albeit narrower than
CEQA's, to widespread attack. The focus on its substantive policies,
though, alleviates the onslaught by giving the lead agency increased
power.
2. The substantive policies
The focus of an agency's substantive power under SEPA surfaces
in the agency's ability to deny a proposal for environmental concerns
alone.218 California agencies have not developed practically tested
substantive authority, and instead use a heightened procedural check
through mitigation and overriding considerations.219 Although the
Washington judiciary reviews an agency's power with a higher level
of scrutiny,220 the agency's authority to deny a proposal compels a
project sponsor to seriously address environmental concerns and in-
tellectually create mitigating and alternative measures. Therefore, if
the agency denies the project without predicated factual circum-
stances, the clearly erroneous standard of review provides the spon-
sor with an adequate remedy.221
The Washington Supreme Court addressed the issue of agency de-
nials in Polygon Corporation v. City of Seattle. 222 In Polygon, the
City of Seattle denied Polygon's application for a building permit be-
cause of the project's possible negative aesthetic impact on the envi-
ronment.223 Polygon asserted that the City did not have the
authority to deny the building permit.224 The court disagreed.225
The Polygon court, interpreting SEPA, opined that to limit the
218. See Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 578 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Wash. 1978) (inter-
preting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 43.21C.030(2)(b) as giving an agency the authority to
deny a proposal on environmental concerns alone). The pertinent statute requires that
in order for an agency to issue a denial, it must find "(1) The proposal would result in
significant adverse impacts identified in a final or supplemental environmental impact
statement prepared under this chapter; and (2) reasonable mitigation measures are in-
sufficient to mitigate the identified impact." WAH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.060.
219. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
220. Polygon, 578 P.2d at 1314. The clearly erroneous standard allows for a broader
review than the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id,
221. Id,
222. 578 P.2d 1309 (Wash. 1978).
223. Id. at 1311. The City found that the project "would have a number of adverse
environmental impacts of varied significance including, among others, view obstruc-
tion, excessive bulk and excessive relative scale, increases in traffic and noise, and
shadow effect .... The most significant impact was visual .. " Id. (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 1312. Polygon contended that procedurally SEPA "serves only an 'infor-
mational' purpose and does not confer substantive authority [for an agency] to act with
reference to the environmental impacts disclosed." Id.
225. Id
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agency to procedural scrutiny of the statute would nullify the actual
policy of the document.226 Consequently, it noted that SEPA's policy
"mandates" that an agency substantively review and decide on pro-
posals affecting the environment.227 This changes a previously minis-
terial agency decision-the issuance of a building permit under the
appropriate zoning ordinances-to a discretionary, legislative decision
on environmental impact considerations.228 Furthermore, the court
stated that SEPA authority shall "overlay" existing powers of state
and local agencies. 229 In other words, agency authority granted prior
to SEPA's enactment will not supplant SEPA's environmental con-
cerns.230 Rather, SEPA's policies and goals supplement the existing
power of government agencies. 231
Along with statutory limitations,232 the judiciary maintains a broad
226. Id. The relevant statute read that "all branches of government of this state...
will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values will be
given appropriate consideration in decision making. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.21C.030(2)(b).
227. Polygon, 578 P.2d at 1312.
228. Id. Cf. Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 235 Cal. Rptr. 788,
794-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (issuing a building permit is ministerial unless the agency
retains some discretionary authority). Generally, building permits exemplify ministe-
rial projects. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15268(b)(1).
229. Polygon, 578 P.2d at 1313. (citing Sisley v. San Juan County, 569 P.2d 712
(Wash. 1977)). See supra note 12.
230. Polygon, 578 P.2d at 1313.
231. Id. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.060. Amendments to this statute tem-
per the scope of the legislative power. The statute now states that any denial by a gov-
ernment agency must result from policies existing at the time of the denial. The
agency shall base any "conditions or denials.., upon policies identified by the appro-
priate governmental authority and incorporated into regulations, plans, or codes which
are formally designated by the agency (or appropriate legislative body, in the case of
local government) as possible bases for the exercise of authority pursuant to this chap-
ter." Id. (emphasis added). One author noted the uncertainty of this limitation:
"This ultimate power to disapprove [i.e., denials by the agency] is clearly
sanctioned by the Washington SEPA although project losers are protected by
some uncertain process rights . . . . [Section 43.21C.060] is either a strict
rulemaking requirement, in which event it will be rarely complied with, or a
loose notice provision, in which event it will be routinely complied with. The
reason that a strict rulemaking precondition would be largely fatal to substan-
tive SEPA is that inventing detailed before-the-fact specifications for sui
generis conflict is an unproductive enterprise, especially for busy deci-
sionmakers who are obliged to respond to problems of the moment at the ex-
pense of big picture rulemaking. If a detailed rule is the sine qua non of a
project denial, it won't happen."
Rodgers, supra note 201, at 61-62.
Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court has reversed agency denials without
appropriate authority. See Cougar Mountain Assoc. v. King County, 765 P.2d 264
(Wash. 1988) (reversal of a denied subdivision application); Victoria Tower Partnership
v. City of Seattle, 745 P.2d 1328 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (remanding a building permit
denial). See generally Roger Pearce, Comment, Death by SEPA: Substantive Denials
Under Washington's State Environmental Policy Act, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143
(1990) (excellent discussion of substantive policies under SEPA).
232. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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check on legislative substantive power.233 In order to compensate for
potential abuses of agency power, the judiciary conducts a clearly er-
roneous standard of review.234 The Washington Supreme Court
adopted this standard of review in Norway Hill and affirmed its ap-
plication to substantive denials in Polygon.
The clearly erroneous standard demands that the court review all
the evidence leading to an agency's decision.235 This differs from the
arbitrary and capricious standard which requires the court to look for
substantial evidence to justify an agency's significance determina-
tion.23 6 Furthermore, the clearly erroneous standard also includes a
review of the public policy envisioned by SEPA.237 In practice, this
provides a judicial check on the subjective decision-making process of
a particular agency.238 While "[t]he court does not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the administrative body," it will, upon full judicial
review of the entire record, "find the decision 'clearly erroneous'
only when it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed." 23 9
Not only does the clearly erroneous standard of review police an
agency's responsibility and abuse of discretion, but it also alerts the
project sponsor that his proposal must conform to SEPA stan-
dards.240 If he fails to consider the Washington statute and decides to
challenge an agency denial, the challenge will fail, provided the
agency has not made a fatal mistake.241 Thus, progressive substan-
tive policies encourage the project sponsor to pay homage to the de-
tails discussed in SEPA. In contrast to CEQA, this results in a more
efficient statutory procedure for all parties involved.
233. See NorwLy Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council,
552 P.2d 674, 678-80 (Wash. 1976).
234. Id, at 678. The Norway Hill decision applies the clearly erroneous standard to
negative threshold decisions. Id See also Polygon, 578 P.2d at 1314 (application to
agency denials).
235. Norway Hill, 552 P.2d at 678 (citations omitted).
236. Id (citations omitted).
237. Id at 678-79. (citations omitted).
238. Polygon, 578 P.2d at 1314. One commentator suggests that "agency decisions
are often made in an atmosphere of intense political pressure, which is conducive to
abuse of discretion." Pearce, supra note 231, at 170-71 (citing Polygon, 578 P.2d at
1314-15).
239. Polygon, 578 P.2d at 1315.
240. See Rodgers, supra note 201, at 40-43.
241. Id.
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V. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CEQA
While CEQA envisions noble policy goals, extremist environmental
groups and citizens opposed to development in their neighborhoods
("not-in-my-backyard" groups) abuse CEQA's youth and confusion in
order to prevent or delay potential development projects. An envi-
ronmental impact report should correctly address the issues con-
cerned with the significance of adverse environmental effects,
possible mitigation measures, alternatives, cumulative impacts and
actual (as opposed to speculative) future projects. In reality, CEQA's
process encourages adversarial groups to harass development project
sponsors for reasons other than environmental concerns.2 42 These
groups find support from the No Oil fair argument test as well as the
redefined public controversy test.243 Not only must parties speculate
on the actual need for an impact report, but they must also speculate
on what they must provide within the report to avoid the inconsis-
tency of the judiciary.2 "4 The adage "better safe than sorry" becomes
a reality when agencies or their consultants draft increasingly more
thorough documents which cover irrelevant material.245 At the time,
these drafts seem necessary to avoid possible litigation even though
the preparation substantially increases costs and sometimes delays
projects indefinitely.2 46 The project developers pass the added costs
on to the consumer through increased real estate prices, 247 landfill
fees (costs associated with trash dumping and pick-ups), timber prices
and mineral commodity prices (not necessarily well-known minerals,
but those used in soaps, deodorants and other necessities). 248 This
system, coupled with impact reports needing revision and final ap-
proval,249 delineates the oft-noted bureaucratic inefficiency.
A good illustration of how a party might delay a proposed project
242. See infra notes 250-65 and accompanying text (empirical study of CEQA).
243. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. Although the courts and the Of-
fice of Planning and Research sufficiently narrowed the public controversy test, the
Guidelines, nevertheless, would find a public controversy in marginal cases when ex-
perts differ on the significant impact. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064(h)(2). See also
Citizen Action to Serve All Students v. Thornley, 272 Cal. Rptr. 83, 90-91 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (disagreement among experts give rise to a significant impact in marginal cases).
In some cases, project opponents can manipulate the nebulous significance determina-
tion to create a marginal case, then pay the appropriate expert to argue their position.
244. See Selmi, supra note 27, at 214-15.
245. See Weiss, supra note 2 ("[E]nvironmental impact reports have evolved into
bloated, unwieldy documents that run up construction costs, entice troublemaking law-
suits and cause unnecessary delay.").
246. See C. Duerksen, Dow vs. California: A TURNING POINT IN THE ENVIROBUSI-
NESS STRUGGLE (1982) (historical perspective of Dow Chemical's infamous CEQA
problems of a proposed chemical production plant).
247. Jube Shiver Jr., Home Builders Seek a Cutback in Regulation, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1991, at B1.
248. Interview with Pat Mitchell, supra note 40.
249. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15064-90, 15160-63.
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comes from an actual study of an environmental impact report and
the subsequent comments submitted to the project sponsor by the op-
posing party.250 Recently a development group prepared an environ-
mental impact report on a proposed residential development near a
mining company's operations area.251 The mining group opposed the
development for fear of subsequent public outcry about mining oper-
ations near the residential project.252 They hired a private consultant
to fight the project in the public hearings held to determine if the
project would have a significant effect on the environment. 253
Following the public hearing, the Community Development De-
partment found that public controversy required an environmental
impact report.254 The report had to address issues raised in a Notice
of Preparation (Notice). Once the sponsor circulated the report, the
hired consultant scrutinized the index of the report to see if the re-
port conformed to the Notice. Inevitably, the consultant found errors
in the report's discussion of aesthetic value, consideration of biologi-
cal damage, and land use provisions. 255 The consultant scoured the
report for any missing technicality to encourage the development
sponsor to sit at the negotiation table.256 The technicalities included
not only the substantive data in the report, but improper notice of
any changes in the planning stages of the project subsequent to the
Notice. For instance, the consultant might argue that a slight bound-
ary change will adversely affect the biological organisms living
within that new boundary line.257 Ordinarily, the sponsor would
have failed to address the boundary change in the Notice as well as
the ensuing report. Often, as in this case, the developer cannot afford
to contest an environmental impact report in court, which is the con-
250. This section is based on an interview with Donna McCormick, an associate and
CEQA consultant with Florian Martinez Associates, a landscape, architecture and land
planning firm in Irvine, California.
251. Eagle Valley Draft EIR, SCH No. 89070312 (City of Corona 1991). This Com-
ment uses a mining company as an example of an adverse group which falls under the
anti-competitive classification rather than an environmental group or "not-in-my-back-
yard" group. While anti-competitive groups often create problems, the other two
groups provide the most adversity. Interview with Pat Mitchell, supra note 40.
252. Interview with Donna McCormick, supra note 250.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. Ms. McCormick has reviewed numerous Draft EIRs. She initially com-
pares the index of the EIR with the Notice of Preparation. She usually will find an
omission. If not, she thoroughly reviews the document for lack of EIR data. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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sultant's ultimate threat.258 Furthermore, the costs of producing en-
vironmental impact reports can be astronomical.5 9 For economic
reasons, the developer might decide to respect the mining company's
wishes or abandon the project altogether for lack of adequate capital.
Even if the project sponsor attempts to appease the mining company,
the mining company might still not approve of the project and file
suit against the adequacy of the environmental impact report. 260 A
win delays the project even longer and possibly forestalls it indefi-
nitely.261 Alternatively, even if the adversarial mining company loses
at trial, the process can still terminate the project due to the delays
and costs generated by the litigation.
The scrutinous eye can learn numerous lessons from the above
case study. First, by providing adequate definitions, CEQA could
help the project sponsor avoid the initial environmental impact re-
port. The Community Development Department, in the above exam-
ple, based its determination on a public controversy. Had the statute
given a more specific definition of what constitutes a project or nar-
rowed the significance determination to relevant environmental is-
sues, the project may have passed and progressed on schedule.262
Second, once the project sponsor issues an environmental impact re-
port, the governmental agency should make an absolute decision to
deny or approve the project.263 The opposing party would then have
to fight the adequacy of the agency's determination rather than stifle
the project on technical grounds. If CEQA defined the decision pro-
cess more precisely, with increased authority and a high standard of
review, the opposing party would have less of a bargaining position.
Third, this case exemplifies a party's use of CEQA for anti-competi-
tive reasons rather than environmental concerns.264 To remedy this,
258. In the illustration, the developer had many investors back out of the project
due to time delays. Id. Furthermore, the developer had trouble adequately predicting
the actual costs of preparing the EIR since continual pressure from the adversarial
group increased the costs periodically. Id,
259. Ms. McCormick noted that the usual cost of an EIR in California can run up to
4% of the project's total cost. In contrast, the cost in other states ranges from one
tenth of one percent to 2% of the total project cost. Id.
260. With this knowledge, an adversarial group realizes that the judicial process
causes delay and increased costs which could compel a developer to abandon the pro-
ject at that particular site. See Weiss, supra note 2 at B1.
261. Usually, the developer, rather than the approving agency, must defend against
an action opposing her particular project. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66474.9 (West 1986). See
Topanga Ass'n For A Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. Rptr. 214,
223 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
262. See infra notes 284-339 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
264. Anti-competitive reasons pertain to private businesses laboring over the use of
the land. In this case, the mining company is at odds with the private development of
housing. California has yet to decide a case that addresses the issue of anti-competition
in CEQA. However, NEPA cases confronting the issue have established a two-prong
standard that a plaintiff must pass in order to have standing. Churchill Truck Lines,
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the statute should address the problem directly by imposing sanc-
tions, attorney's fees, and costs on an unsuccessful plaintiff.265
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF CEQA
A. Current Problems with CEQA
In many cases, adequate drafting of an environmental impact re-
port will avoid delays, costs and other CEQA problems.266 The re-
port drafter understands that she must, at a minimum, include a
project's potential effects on the environment, mitigation measures
concerning those effects, and possible alternatives. 26 7 On the other
hand, properly drafted reports still face needless scrutiny.268 Oppo-
nents of a proposed project can prevent its fruition in numerous
ways. For instance, the greater the CEQA caseload, the less the bu-
reaucracy can handle them.26 9 Due to a meritless environmental
controversy, the project developer must delay the project until final
agency approval.270 This could lead many investors to avoid develop-
ment projects entirely, given their potential for serious delay. Never-
theless, the developer eventually will pass on the added costs of
development, caused by the needless defenses, to the consumer in the
form of higher housing and development costs.2 7 1 The United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development "contends that 'un-
necessary regulations at all levels of government stifle the ability of
the private housing industry to meet the increasing demand for af-
fordable housing throughout the country.' "272 Further delay occurs
when federal, state, and local governmental agencies all must review
Inc. v. U.S., 533 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1976). A plaintiff must first allege that opposed
action caused him injury. Secondly, the affected interest must fall within the zone of
interest protected or regulated by the statute. Id& CEQA looks to NEPA as pursuasive
authority in CEQA cases. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono
County, 502 P.2d 1049, 1062-63 (Cal. 1972).
265. See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
266. Interview with M. Andriette Adams, partner with Culbertson & Adams, a
planning law firm in Aliso Viejo, California.
267. Id, Some authorities, including Ms. Adams, strongly believe that inadequate
drafting causes most of the problems with CEQA.
268. See infra notes 283-300 and accompanying text.
269. In the City of Los Angeles, the average report takes 12 to 18 months to pro-
cess. Daniel P. Garcia, Environmental Impact Reports and Growth Control, L.A. LAW.,
Jan. 1991, at 19. The present backlog in Los Angeles' Department of Planning ap-
proaches 100 reports. Under the present processing format, it could take more than 10
years to clear the backlog. Id. That estimate does not include an increasing caseload.
270. Shiver, supra note 247 at B2.
271. Id.
272. Id
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a project. 273 The process becomes a "political and convoluted af-
fair."'274 In fact, one commentator noted that "CEQA continues to be
the single most important tool of sophisticated slow-growth
forces."275
As stated in the previous empirical study, "not-in-my-backyard"
advocates, as well as extremist environmental groups, make up the
majority of development objectors.276 Due to the complexity of
CEQA, objectors can easily challenge a project by finding a proce-
dural mishap in the CEQA process.277 Once a CEQA case enters the
judiciary, the courts inevitably expand the number and type of
projects subject to review.278 Thus, the CEQA process can stifle pro-
foundly needed private development in exchange for deteriorating
cities.279 With increasingly scarce government revenues, private de-
velopment could provide a substantial portion of a city's redevelop-
ment plans. With governments needing to impose cutbacks to cure
deficit ills, private development can create jobs for projects that the
government once funded. The legislature can complement private in-
dustry by adopting a more narrow environmental policy.
An example of CEQA's complicated procedural guidelines prevent-
ing approval of an otherwise beneficial project arose when the Cali-
fornia State University chose Taylor Ranch in Ventura County as a
potential campus site.28 0 Patagonia Corporation fought the proposed
site, fearing that the campus would increase traffic and air pollu-
273. A draft environmental impact report can list numerous agencies that must
oversee the project. For instance, on one mining project, federal agencies included the
Bureau of Land Management, United States Forest Services, Department of Justice,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of Labor, Mine, Safety and
Health Administration, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the United States
Army Corps of Engineers. State agencies included the State Attorney General, Cali-
fornia Department of Fish and Game, Regional Water Quality Control Board and the
State Land Commission; local agencies included the Fire Warden, Flood Control and
the Office of Surveyor/Drainage. Pat Mitchell, Address at the Mining Taxation and
Financial Reporting Conference, Las Vegas Nevada (Sept. 18, 1990). See also Shiver,
supra note 246, at B2 (more than 30 agencies divided between local, state and federal
agencies may have to review an impact statement which could delay a project up to
two years).
274. Garcia, supra note 269, at 19.
275. Id.
276. See Weiss, supra note 2; Garcia, supra note 269, at 19.
277. See Weiss, supra note 2.
278. Id.
279. See Mark Ryavec, A Pact to End Development Gridlock, L.A. TIMES, April 30,
1989, § 5, at 5. Ryavec states that
[f]ar too often the question is not how to build in harmony with the commu-
nity but whether any building will be allowed at all... [which] denies us the
tools to cope with the city's many ills: traffic congestion, scarce affordable
housing, visual blight and lack of open space. We are also impeded from reju-
venating the basic physical elements that comprise a city-its living quarters,
commercial areas, its streets and sewers.
Id. 280. Weiss, supra note 2.
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tion.281 By continually fighting the environmental impact report on
procedural grounds, Patagonia successfully delayed the project for
two years; costs to the University soared over one million dollars and,
ultimately, state officials chose a new site in Ventura County.282
Ironically, the Taylor Ranch community now feels that a university
on its hillsides would enhance the beauty of its community better
than the inevitable development of condominiums that will soon ben-
efit from the spectacular ocean view. s
B. Recent Courts Confront the Problems by Raising the Judicial
Standard of Review
The legislature designed CEQA to inform the public that its chosen
officials properly consider the environmental effects before approv-
ing a project, as well as help the public express its environmental
concerns.28 4 While the statute must adequately provide for these pol-
icies, it must also prevent broad interpretations of CEQA which fur-
ther non-environmental concerns.285 The California judiciary has yet
to coin a universal standard for dealing with frivolous claims or for
imposing sanctions.286
As early as 1986, courts began to notice frivolous lawsuits initiated
to stop a project which the litigant could not prevent through the
agency decision. One court of appeal addressed this issue in Long
Beach Savings & Loan Association v. Redevelopment Agency.287 In
that case, the court acknowledged the Savings & Loan's provocation
of burdensome administrative hearings and paperwork as attempts to
prevent a building demolition.288 The court rejected such attempts
based on an improper use of the statutory guidelines.28 9
281. ldM
282. Id
283. Id.
284. CAL. PUB. RES. § 21000.
285. See Selmi, supra note 27, at 199 (CEQA strongly attacked for the major abuses
to its procedures).
286. But see infra note 301 and accompanying text.
287. 232 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
288. d. at 780. The court stated, "To allow the public review period to proceed ad
nauseam would only serve to arm persons dead set against a project with a paralyzing
weapon: hired experts who can always discover flaws in mitigation measures. As pre-
viously noted, the purpose of CEQA is to inform government decision makers and
their constituency of the consequences of a given project, not to derail it in a sea of
administrative hearings and paperwork." Id, See how this fits in the case study supra
notes 242-65 and accompanying text (the empirical study).
289. Long Beach Savings, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
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More recently, the No Oil fair argument test has received criticism
with respect to its abuse by project opponents and its inconsistent ap-
plication.290 The California Supreme Court's closing dictum in the
Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors291 opinion was a
clear warning. The court stated that "rules regulating the protection
of the environment must not be subverted into an instrument for the
oppression and delay of social, economic, or recreational development
and advancement." 29 2
Subsequent lower court decisions have heeded the supreme court's
dicta. As review, the No Oil significant impact analysis requires an
environmental impact report whenever a project opponent can offer
a fair argument based on substantial evidence that the proposed pro-
ject will have a significant effect on the environment. 293 The lower
courts have increasingly tightened this standard in an attempt to
eliminate anti-development groups that invoke the CEQA process for
purposes having no environmental consequence. 294 For instance, in
Benton v. Board of Supervisors,295 the California Court of Appeal
seemed to acknowledge that Benton opposed a winery project, not on
environmental grounds, but because the Board approved relocating
the winery to Benton's neighborhood.296 Benton cited project noise
as the potential impact requiring an environmental impact report.
The court rejected Benton's argument by raising the standard of re-
290. See Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514, 528 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (easing a challenge to an agency's fair argument determination by only re-
quiring substantial evidence to the contrary of the agency decision rather than al-
lowing deference to fair argument of the agency's determination); Board of
Supervisors of Sacramento County v. Sacramento Local Agency Form. Comm'n, 286
Cal. Rptr. 171, 193, (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (no deference to an agency's factual determina-
tion); Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino, 248 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(EIR may be required in the absence of substantial evidence one way or another); Citi-
zens Ass'n for Sensible Dev. of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, 217 Cal. Rptr. 893, 914-
15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the lo-
cal agency"); Newberry Springs Water Ass'n v. County of San Bernardino, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 100, 118-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (court reluctantly bows to agency factual
findings).
291. 801 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990).
292. Id, at 1175.
293. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529 P.2d 66, 83 (Cal. 1974).
294. See Tina A. Thomas, CEQA Challenges Face A New Level of Scrutiny, CONTIN-
UING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, LAND USE FORUM, at 54 (Spring 1992). Benton v. Board
of Supervisors, 277 Cal. Rptr. 481, 490-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Uhler v. City of Encin-
itas 278 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that the dissenters failed to
base their objection on environmental grounds); Leonoff v. Board of Supervisors, 272
Cal. Rptr. 372, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding an agency's consideration of "the big
picture"). Although the court has calmly addressed these cases, further abuse of the
system could cause the court to be less tolerant. See Thomas, supra, at 55.
295. 277 Cal. Rptr. 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
296. Id at 490-91. The project was originally given a negative declaration one mile
from the relocation site. Id, at 484-85. Benton argued that the relocation needed an
environmental impact report because of the changed conditions of the project. Id.
The court held that a second negative declaration sufficed. Id
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view to a "substantial evidence" test.29 7
Along with the "not-in-my-backyard" cases, the California Court of
Appeal has rejected challenges to projects that object solely on cul-
tural and social grounds.298 Furthermore, since CEQA expressly ex-
cludes cases concerning economic impact,2 some opponents attempt
to mask their opposition to a project's adverse economic effects under
supposed environmental concerns.30o In these cases, the court might
impose sanctions on the plaintiff for bringing a frivolous lawsuit.3 01
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The California legislature frequently amends CEQA as new judi-
cial interpretations arise and also in response to developers' costs and
delays.302 Furthermore, the Office of Planning and Research meets
every two years to update the CEQA Guidelines.3 03 Conceivably, this
297. The court opined that the substantial evidence test applies in situations where
the issue concerns a second negative declaration. The test requires an EIR
only if (1) subsequent changes were proposed which required important revi-
sions of the previous negative declaration because of new significant environ-
mental impacts not considered in the initial negative declaration,
(2) substantial changes will occur with respect to the circumstances under
which the project is to be undertaken requiring important revisions of the ini-
tial negative declaration because of new significant environmental impacts not
covered in the previous negative declaration, or (3) new information of sub-
stantial importance to the project became available."
Id. at 490-91 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15162(a)). Even though the court nar-
rowly applied the substantial evidence test, it openly rejected the plaintiffs' frivolous
claim. Id, See Thomas, supra note 294, at 55 (even though the court did not openly
criticize the plaintiffs, they might have rejected the "not-in-my-backyard" mentality).
298. See Thomas, supra note 294, at 55 (citing Citizens Action to Serve All Students
v. Thornley, 272 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
299. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21068; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15382; see also Cit-
izens for Quality Growth v. City of Mount Shasta, 243 Cal. Rptr. 727, 734 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
300. See Centinela Hosp. v. City of Inglewood, 275 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (evidence tended to show that that lawsuit was filed for economic effects on a
nearby corporation). But see Citizens Ass'n for Sensible Dev. of Bishop Area v.
County of Inyo, 217 Cal. Rptr. 893, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (physical impacts resulting
from economic effects fall under CEQA).
301. Although the courts have yet to impose sanctions for frivolous lawsuits in
CEQA cases, the Second District Court of Appeal suggested that it would consider
sanctioning a frivolous claim. See Mann v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 285
Cal. Rptr. 9, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). However, the court did not consider sanctions in
Centinela. See supra note 300. Strikingly, the court considered attorney's fees for the
plaintiff in Citizens Ass'n for Sensible Dev. of Bishop Area, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
302. CONTINUING EDUCATION, supra note 28, at 5 (1991).
303. 1& at 6. This meeting is codified under California Public Resources Code, Sec-
tion 21087. The California Supreme Court has yet to determine the actual authority of
the Guidelines, although it has opined that courts should give the Guidelines "great
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system will eventually help the legislature to perfect the CEQA pro-
cess. In the meantime, inadequate report drafting, or abuse of the
CEQA process, or both, will cause the consumer to pay for the bu-
reaucratic inefficiency through increased costs and investment diffi-
culties. Waiting for the judiciary to implement changes not only
takes an inordinate amount of time, but it leaves behind those project
sponsors who cannot afford to litigate. The legislature must clarify
CEQA to remedy the present inefficiency and provide consistency for
the small businesses.
Supporters of the present CEQA process claim that it successfully
prevented an eruption of mini-malls, extraordinary traffic congestion
and overall careless development.so4 Even those affected by CEQA's
procedures applaud its overall intentions.3 05 One advocate stated, "I
may not like some of the results and the time it takes, but on balance
it is better to have than have not .... I sometimes don't like the 55-
m.p.h. speed limit either... [b]ut I'd rather have it.""s 6 Thus, most
people agree that an agency must publicize the effects of a project's
environmental impacts to some degree.
Yet, experience proves that CEQA does not effectively achieve its
goal. At present, the costs and delays created by the preparation of
an environmental impact report hinder the small business owner's
ability to receive the private investment required for a development
project. 30 7 Eventually, only large-scale, wealthy development compa-
nies will have the adequate capital and time to await approval of a
proposed project. Thus, opportunities for the entrepreneur are
quickly diminishing or becoming contingent on the will of a project
opposer. In a time of recession, and possibly depression, this could
exacerbate the economic hardships facing the country.3 08 One must
remember that development includes not only new housing and com-
weight ... except when a provision is clearly unauthorized or erroneous." Id at 7-8
(quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278,
282 n.2 (Cal. 1988)).
304. Weiss, supra note 2. The article cites the San Fernando Valley as an example
of degenerate growth before the institution of CEQA: "'Look at the San Fernando
Valley, that was built before CEQA .... They have landfills erupting like boils, their
transportation corridors are comatose and they have no concept of open space.'" Id
(quoting Neil Moyer, president of the Environmental Coalition of Ventura County).
305. Id.
306. 1& (citing Fred Maas, vice president of Potomac Investment Associates).
307. See Ryavec, supra note 279.
308. See Thomas McCarroll, Starting Over, TIME, Jan. 6, 1992, at 62. The author
noted that entrepreneurs find it increasingly difficult to raise venture capital:
The challenge has become especially acute because the flow of venture capi-
tal, so abundant in the 1980s, has dried up as investors have become more cau-
tious. The amount of venture capital during 1990 fell 53% from the previous
year, to $202 million. When the numbers for 1991 are in they are expected to
show an even steeper decline.
Id,
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mercial areas, but also redevelopment, such as street paving and
renovating deteriorated cities. With CEQA risks, private developers
have less incentive to support redevelopment projects. Many of the
costs that adversarial groups generate shift to the taxpayer as the
government must fund the redevelopment of outdated structures and
worn-down streets.309 CEQA should promote competition for these
projects.
CEQA needs to address the current problems by instituting a "new
social contract" between the governmental agencies, developers, and
adversarial groups. 310 In other words, CEQA should incorporate the
basic constitutional guarantee that no citizen shall be deprived of the
right to life, liberty and property without due process of law.3 "
Therefore, the legislature should adopt a measure which would es-
tablish the developer's property right to build a feasible project
before the CEQA process commences. 312 Thus, the developer can as-
sure investors that the project will be completed in one form or an-
other.313 Alternatively, if the project is unfeasible, the developer will
309. The need for earthquake-safe buildings is a prime example. Likewise, the re-
development of Los Angeles after the 1992 riots will clearly face various CEQA
difficulties.
310. Ryavec, swpra note 279. Ryavec intelligently defines the scope of a "new so-
cial contract":
Under this proposed truce, property owners and developers would agree to
fully mitigate all adverse impacts on a community from a new project. The
environmental review mandated by [CEQA] would be the process used to ob-
jectively determine impacts and subsequent mitigation measures. If particular
deleterious impacts cannot be alleviated, then the project would be limited or
another use could be made of the site. A commitment to abide by such a pro-
cess would by a substantial concession from developers.
For their part, city elected officials, planners and neighborhood activists
would accede to the following: They would accept that owners have the right
to develop their property (except in cases where proposed uses pose signifi-
cant danger to life and limb); they would agree that a recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision prevents cities from requiring developers to ameliorate pre-ex-
isting conditions (despite the decision, cities often go beyond it unless litiga-
tion is threatened); and finally, the city would establish a process to alert
neighbors early and to choose representatives who understand the planning
process and would speak with authority for their neighborhood. Too often de-
velopers negotiate in good faith with ad hoc community representatives only
to be blind-sided by a second or third "neighborhood group" late in the
process.
Id (emphasis added.).
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
312. See Ryavec, supra note 279. CEQA should acknowledge that "since the permit
process is so long and the expenses incurred in site acquisition, environmental reports
and architectural drawings are so great, some means of locking-in the right to build
prior to receipt of the actual building permit should be considered." L
313. If the builder proposes a project that is clearly environmentally adverse, he
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avoid wasteful expenses.
Incorporating the lessons of sister states' environmental policies
into CEQA would also provide for a more workable statute. Notably,
every state must address subjective concerns. Additionally, however,
the California legislature should make the CEQA process more ob-
jective, and thus promote a consistent method of determining the
consequences of a development. This would assist project sponsors in
the initial development stages and eliminate groundless adversarial
attacks.3 14 For example, New York incorporates the successes of
CEQA in SEQRA, but it also expands on CEQA concepts.
SEQRA's expansive definition of "project" gives a developer pre-
liminary notice of what a government agency will or will not scruti-
nize.31 5  CEQA and its Guidelines avoid an all-encompassing
definition.316 Rather, CEQA provides a general definition, while the
Guidelines periodically add particular case adjudications to narrow
the definition.3 17 By providing a definition that sufficiently outlines
boundaries where an agency absolutely will or will not require an en-
vironmental impact report, CEQA would create a reference for de-
velopers to decide what type of project to pursue.31 8 For instance,
the statute could establish a minimum and maximum number of
units or acreage per development project that CEQA addresses in one
capacity or another.31 9 The definition could also address the size of
the city or town involved, the number of parking spaces allotted, as
well as a number of aesthetic factors.3 20 The legislature could adopt
any number of creative options to help a developer avoid needless
disputes over whether a certain project requires an environmental
impact report.3 2 ' Ultimately, the developer should be able to rely on
the statute to determine what type of project CEQA does and does
not cover.
Unlike a definition of "project," providing an inflexible definition
of "significant effect" on the environment admittedly does more
probably should bear the initial costs for negligently instituting the process. A more
workable statute would solidify this proposition.
314. This article cannot address every existing environmental policy without a
lengthy discussion. It will discuss some examples, but the legislature has the re-
sources, such as the Office of Planning and Research, to scour other states' environ-
mental policies and their successes and failures. The study could present some
astounding results.
315. See supra note 155-72 and accompanying text (defining SEQRA project).
316. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21065; CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 14, § 15378.
317. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21065; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15378(a)(4), (5).
318. See upra note 155-72 and accompanying text (defining SEQRA project).
319. Id,
320. Id
321. See generally, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 21 (setting forth the implementation of
CEQA in the Department of Transportation).
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harm than good.322 An agency determines the environmental signifi-
cance of a project according to various factors. A project which has a
significant effect in one area may not have such an effect in another
area.3 23 Nevertheless, some suggestions could help make CEQA's de-
termination easier on the project sponsors and give the courts more
guidance. With statutory help, the developers might experience less
litigation and more summary judgments.
Washington's SEPA exemplifies two possible methods of strength-
ening a significance determination. First, SEPA adopts the federal
definition of a significant impact.324 Under this definition, a signifi-
cant impact occurs "whenever more than a moderate effect .. .is a
reasonable probability."325 In contrast, CEQA defines "significant ef-
fect" as "whenever it can be fairly argued on the basis of substantial
evidence that the project may have significant environmental im-
pact."3 26 Allowing environmental impact reports on projects which
"may" have a significant effect creates subjective speculation in the
minds of adversarial groups. Furthermore, the courts' inconsistent
interpretation fosters speculative litigation results. By narrowing the
definition to those projects which have more than a moderate
probability of substantially affecting the environment, the statute
would make the significance determination more objective. This may
eliminate at least some of the adversarial groups' hollow claims.
Second, Washington takes pride in SEPA's substantive policies.32?
Under SEPA, governmental agencies act as a Public Trust in protect-
ing the state's natural resources.328 Thus, Washington agencies have
clear authority to approve or disapprove a project based upon the
project's environmental impact report.3 29 Approval of the project
mandates that the project sponsor conform to the substantive re-
quirements of SEPA, while disapproval indicates that the project
sponsor failed to meet such requirements.330
322. See Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council,
552 P.2d 674, 680 (Wash. 1976).
323. For example, an agency may make a significance determination related to traf-
fic problems. Thus, a densely populated area will more likely allow for a small project
than would a less populated area.
324. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
325. Norway Hill, 552 P.2d at 680.
326. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529 P.2d 66, 70 (Cal. 1974) (emphasis
added).
327. See supra notes 218-41 and accompanying text.
328. See Rodgers, supra note 201, at 64.
329. See supra notes 218-41 and accompanying text.
330. See Rodgers, supra note 201, at 59.
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CEQA gives agencies a seldom-used authority to disapprove a pro-
ject on environmental grounds alone.33 ' However, CEQA authorities
believe that the statute, in practicality, serves as a mere informa-
tional document supporting self-government.3 3 2 Coupled with a
broadly interpreted judicial standard of review, 3 CEQA becomes in-
credibly useful to environmental extremists and "not-in-my-back-
yard" advocates.
The judiciary, following the increased erosion of the public contro-
versy and occasionally heightened fair argument standard of review,
seem increasingly willing to eliminate baseless claims. The legisla-
ture could codify a judicial standard of review that promotes substan-
tive agency decisions. For instance, a uniform, high-threshold
judicial standard of review would substantially diminish a project op-
poser's bargaining power outside of the CEQA process.3 34 Such a
provision would emphasize a governmental agency's ultimate sub-
stantive authority.3 3 5
Another approach involves the use of a hearing officer. After an
agency determines that a project necessitates an environmental im-
pact report, the project sponsor would commission a report from
either the appropriate government agency or a private consulting
firm. After final preparation, the sponsor would submit the environ-
mental impact report to a hearing officer.3 36 The hearing officer
would conduct a public hearing on the project. After examining le-
gitimate public concerns, the hearing officer would offer findings and
recommendations to the lead agency for its decision. The agency
would have the authority to incorporate the hearing officer's sugges-
tions. The agency's final decision would bind the project sponsor and
its adversaries. The added procedural hearing would effectively elim-
inate bias in an agency's approval or disapproval of the project. Ulti-
mately, the parties would have the burden of satisfying a high
judicial standard of review if they intended to pursue litigation.337
331. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002, 21002.1; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§§ 15002(h)(5), 15042.
332. See Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, 271 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (CEQA provisions are mere policy statements that give agencies no more power
than that of mitigation and overriding considerations). See also Laurel Heights Im-
provement Ass'n of San Francisco v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 293-94
(Cal. 1988) (allowing public criticism fosters self government).
333. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
334. Interview with Pat Mitchell, supra note 40.
335. Id.
336. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21B.
337. Much of the discussion regarding the hearing officer was promulgated from
the interview with Ms. Adams. See supra note 266. For the present state of review,
see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21168, 21168.5. See East Peninsula Educ. Council, Inc. v.
Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., 258 Cal. Rptr. 147, 152-53 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989). The East Peninsula court stated, "An agency's use of an erroneous legal stan-
dard constitutes a failure to proceed in a manner required by law. The interpretation
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Furthermore, questionable claims should result in court-imposed
sanctions, or at least fees and costs, on the litigiou's party.338
Finally, the legislature needs to respond to the judiciary's disfavor
of illegitimate claim. 339 If the legislature amended CEQA to impose
attorney's fees, costs, sanctions, and even lost opportunity costs (in-
cluding the loss of investments) on frivolous claims brought by an
adversarial group, the opponent would be discouraged from delaying
or starving a project. One authority suggests that the statute base
compensation for frivolous claims on a percentage of the actual value
of the project rather than on reasonable attorney's fees. 340 Once the
courts set a precedent against frivolous claims, project sponsors will
possess reliable authority to avoid the adversarial group's baseless
claims.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Environmental policies on both the federal and state level produce
welcomed restraints on development projects. With California's obvi-
ous increase in population, the potential for environmental dangers
has increased substantially. CEQA mandates environmentally in-
formed decision-making on every project a developer wishes to un-
dertake. The legislature needs to procure CEQA's purpose by
eliminating abusive claims initiated solely to prevent an otherwise
environmentally conscious project. Currently, the project opponent
is victorious regardless of the outcome of a CEQA case because of the
delays and costs carried by the sponsor. This often causes a small
business to abort its plans. This becomes even more apparent in eco-
nomically difficult times where a business' livelihood centers on
proper interpretation of legislative mandates. Ultimately, the loss of
small businesses strengthens large corporations, which monopolize
an industry and pass any increased costs on to the consumer. The
and applicability of a statute is a question of law requiring an independent determina-
tion by the reviewing court." Id. See also Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Han-
ford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 659-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Notwithstanding prejudicial error,
the courts will generally give great deference to an agency decision. El Dorado Union
High Sch. Dist. v. City of Placerville, 192 Cal. Rptr. 480, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
338. See CAL. CODE OF CiV. PROC. § 1021.5 (West 1983); see also San Bernardino
Valley Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423, 430-33
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Schwartz v. City of Rosemead, 202 Cal. Rptr. 400, 405-10 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984). Unfortunately, these cases fail to suggest any sanctions other than attor-
ney's fees.
339. See supra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
340. Interview with Pat Mitchell, supra note 40.
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inefficiency of CEQA, coupled with the loss of competitive develop-
ment, could result in sky-rocketing housing costs, depressed raw land
values, and continued deterioration of existing city structures.
Ideally, a potential developer, or redeveloper, should be able to re-
fer to CEQA as a consistent guide to environmentally conscious de-
velopment. Initially, the developer should be able to refer to CEQA
to establish what type of project he intends to pursue. If CEQA cov-
ers his project, he then looks for an exemption. Without an exemp-
tion, he must refer to the significance determination. If his project
will significantly impact the environment, he can then invent crea-
tive mitigation measures. If mitigation measures will not alleviate
the impact, he can decide on a new project. Ultimately, the devel-
oper must submit his project to the agency. The agency may prepare
an environmental impact report, and make a final determination as
to the project's viability. Logically, the developer preordains whether
the agency will approve his project by properly researching and miti-
gating adverse environmental impacts.
The concept is simple, but the bureaucracy is difficult. Inevitably,
the modernization of society, the advances in technology, and the in-
creases in population necessitate the building and rebuilding of cities,
streets, sewers, and the like. Unquestionably, all parties involved-
government officials, developers, and environmentally conscious
groups-envision the same goal. They all hope to find some common
ground between economic development and preservation of the envi-
ronment. However, to achieve this goal, all parties involved must
work together. Thus, the legislature must restructure CEQA in or-
der to militate a universally beneficial CEQA process.
SEAN STUART VARNER
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